UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA:
THE CASE OF COEDUCATION AT
VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE
JULIE

M.

AMSTEIN*

Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), a state-supported school of
higher education, was founded in 1839 as a four-year military institute.
Many men who graduated from this prestigious school have become
generals and leaders of the country.1 The Board of Visitors, whose
members are appointed by the Governor, is the primary governing
body for the school.2 Since its founding, this Board has maintained
the objective of providing VMI's education to males only.3 This
admissions policy, which denies women the opportunity of VMI's
unique education, has been under attack as unconstitutional. The
attack began in 1989 when a Virginia woman's application was
rejected based on her gender.4
* J.D. candidate, Washington College of Law at The American University, 1995; AKB.,
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1. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892-93 (4th Cir. 1992), vacating,766 F. Supp.
1407, 1409 (W.D. Va. 1991), cert. denied, Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431
(1993), and on remand, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
2. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated by, 976 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2431 (1993),
and on remand, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
3. irginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1415.
4. John F. Harris, Ghosts of Old irginiaHaunt VMI Biased Trial WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1991,
at Cl. The Citadel has been facing the courts on the same issue as the Virginia Military
Institute. On February 15, 1990, The Citadel rejected its first woman, who applied to the
academy despite the all-male admissions policy. The CitadelRejects Woman as Cadet, WASH. POST,
Feb. 15, 1990, at A18. Three years later, a federal appeals court blocked Shannon Faulkner
from enrolling until it could hear further discussion concerning whether the military college
should be required to admit women. Around the Nation, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1993, at A9. In
January, 1994, U.S. Supreme Court ChiefJustice William Rehnquist ruled that Faulkner could
attend The Citadel as a civilian, but could not live on campus, wear a uniform, or take part in
any cadet activities. Henry Eichel, Citadel Trial NearsEnd; Appeal Likely; FaulknerReflects Women-
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The United States Department of Justice issued an ultimatum in
early February, 1990 that VMI must change its all-male admissions
policy by February 20th of that year, or the Justice Department would
file a federal lawsuit.' On March 1, 1990, the United States Justice
Department filed suit against VMI, claiming the admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia heard the case and issued a
decision in 1991, holding that VMI's policy was not unconstitutional.7
The following year, the United States appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. It contended that Virginia's
objective of diversity in education, asserted by the state in the district
court, was not legitimate. Therefore, the state could notjustify VMI's
admissions policy.' The court found the objective of the school to
be permissible, but found the exclusion of women, without providing
them the same opportunity, questionable. Thejudgment was vacated,
and the case remanded to the district court.9 Therefore, the court
of appeals required VMI to take measures necessary to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment."
The choice of measures included
admitting women, abandoning state-support of the institution, or
developing a remedial plan that would create a parallel program and
that would address the constitutional concerns expressed by the
Justice Department."
VMI chose to establish a separate, parallel program for women.
The plan, proposing a separate leadership institute at Mary Baldwin
College-a neighboring, all-female school-was submitted to the
district court in September, 1993. On November 15, 1993, theJustice

Only Option, WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at Al.
U.S. DistrictJudge C. Weston Houck will issue his decision in July as to whether women must
be admitted to the Citadel. Chris Barritt, Around the South Sex Bias CaseJudgeBerates Lauyer, Vows
CitadelRuling Soon: A Ruling on the Sex Bias Suit is Vowed by Mid-July, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., June
17, 1994, at A3. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
5. Peter Baker, Women Cadets? VMI Hears a Call to Battle, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1990, at D1.
6. Peter Baker, U.S. Files Its VMT Lawsuit; Action Seeks to Force Admission of Women, WASH.
PosT, Mar. 2, 1990, at Cl; United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated
y, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2431 (1993), and on remand, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994). The
Department ofJustice also joined the Citadel case. What if The Citadel Lost its R.O.T.C Funds?,
N.Y. TIMFs, June 5, 1994.
7. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated by, 976 F,2d
890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431, and on
remand, United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
8. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 891.
9. Id. at 891.
10. Id. at 900.
11. Id
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Department responded to the plan, stating that it did not provide an
adequate alternative to admitting women to VMI.' 2 A hearing in
early 1994 allowed the district court to consider all arguments
concerning the plan. 3 On April 29, the district court held that the
plan was constitutional and gave VMI permission to begin implemen14
tation.
The situation with VMI exemplifies the continuing struggle the
courts face regarding the issue of gender-based classification and
equal protection. The Constitution is constantly being re-interpreted
to ensure that citizens' rights are protected. Equality, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been a highly pronounced area of the
law for race and gender. These classifications are particularly evident
in the education field. Consequently, the Supreme Court has heard
numerous equal protection arguments, concerning race and
gender-based classifications, and the denial of benefits in education
because of these classifications. In related decisions, the Court has
struggled to determine how to best provide equal protection and has
relied on two levels of judicial review: strict scrutiny for race, and
intermediate scrutiny for gender. The recent case, in which the
United States challenges VMI's all-male admissions policy, provides an
excellent basis for analyzing this constitutional doctrine.'" This piece

12. Robert O'HarrowJr., U.S. Decries VMIPlanfor Women, WASH. PosT, Nov. 16,1993, at E6.
13. Id.
14. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
15. Two statutes have been considered in previous analyses of military academies and
coeducation. First, a federal mandate was issued in 1975, and was amended in 1988, requiring
United States Service Academies to admit women. Marcia Berman, An Equal ProtectionAnalysis
of Public and Private All-Male Military Schools, 23 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 211 n.1 (1991) (citing 10
U.S.C. §§ 2009, 4342); see also Lucille M. Ponte, Waldie Answered: Equal Protection and the
Admissions of Women to Military Colleges and Academies, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1137-38 n.3 (1991).
Yet, as of September 15, 1994, two military colleges, the Virginia Military Institute and The
Citadel in South Carolina, still remained all male. In addition, no female military colleges have
been established. Berman, supra, at 211 n.2. The academies' reluctance to become
coeducational confirms that "[c]ertain military colleges and academies have been either slow
to accept or obstinately opposed to the admission of women." Ponte, supra, at 1139.
Second, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination for all
"institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and
... public institutions of undergraduate higher education." Bennett L. Saferstein, Revisiting
Plessy At The Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex Educationwith EqualProtection, 54 U.
PrTT. L. REv. 637, 673 (1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-2000c-9 (1988)). However, the
legislative provision does have an exception that where single-sex schools already exist, "all the
benefits available to one sex [must] be made available to the other sex." Inner-City Single-Sex
Schools: EducationalReform or Invidious Discrimination?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1741, 1754 (1992)
[hereinafter Inner-City Schools]. As a result of these two clauses, the question has arisen whether
mandatory coeducation was the aim of the legislation. Saferstein, supra, at 673-74. One
response is that the statute does not require coeducation, but it does forbid discrimination.
Jones ex rel Michele v. Board of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
converting an all-girl high school into a coeducational school did not violate Titie IX). "In
enacting Title IX, Congress sought to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminato-
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will focus on whether VMI's policy presents a constitutional violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of any statutory remedy
that may exist.
Section I of this article presents the formulation, rationale, and
early application of the separate but equal doctrine. This theory,
applied initially to discrimination based on race, was applied in the
educational context tojustify the establishment of separate educational institutions. However, since the 1950s, the theory of separate but
equal has been erased from areas that directly or indirectly implicate
race. As will be discussed, it has been determined that separation in
education is inherently unequal when race is concerned. The
inequality derives from the denial of intangible factors to certain
members of society. Although the doctrine of separate but equal has
not been completely eradicated in terms of gender-based classifications, it is important to consider because parallels can be seen
between the judicial decisions on race and gender-based classifications.
Section II considers cases that trace the development of equal
protection in the realm of gender and education. These cases can be
viewed as analogous to the separate but equal line of cases. Although
the result for gender has not yet been that the concept of separate is
inherently unequal, 6 the denial of intangible factors is recognized

ry practices, and to provide individual citizens effective protection against such practices." Id.
(citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). In conjunction with Title
IX, the Equal Educational Opportunity Act seems to support single-sex education as long as
equal single-sex and coeducational alternatives exist and "the separation of the sexes is not a
smokescreen used to disguise some other illegal motivation." Inner-City Schools, supra, at 1755
(citing Note, The Constitutionalityof Sex Separationin School DesegregationPlans, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
296, 325-26 (1970)).
The Court addressed the issue of statutory violations in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982). Its analysis in that case emphasized that statutory compliance does not
necessarily guarantee that constitutional compliance also exists. The Court held that the portion
of Title IX, §901 (a) (5), which exempts schools that traditionally have a policy of admitting only
students of one gender, applied to Mississippi University for Women. However, the Court
further found the provision provided the state no solace. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733. "[A] statute
apparently governing a dispute cannot be applied byjudges, consistently with their obligations
under the Supremacy Clause, when such an application of the statute would conflict with the
Constitution." Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (citing Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (1803))). Congress may exempt the institution from a statutory violation, but it
did not intend the provisions of Title IX to exempt schools from their constitutional obligations.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732-33.
Although the ramifications of these legislative enactments are worthy of consideration, the
possible statutory violations of Virginia Military Institute's all-male admissions policy will not be
addressed in this paper.
16. In fact, counterarguments to the application of this line of reasoning assert that
single-sex institutions do not even attempt to be separate but equal. Many women's colleges are
founded on the belief that an all-female environment is distinct and superior. See generally Ruth
Schmidt, The Role of Women's Colleges in the Future, in WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN
AMERICAN HISTORY: ESSAYS FROM THE MOUNT HOLYOKE SESQUICENTENNIAL SYMPOSIA 198 (John
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as part of the equal protection consideration involving gender. This
section also develops the relationship between the Supreme Court's
level of review for gender-based classifications, intermediate scrutiny,
and equal protection arguments. These first two sections lay the
foundation for the rest of the article, which focuses on VMI's all-male
admissions policy and the proposed remedial plan that allegedly
provides women equal opportunity and equal protection.
Section III presents the two courts' decisions regarding VMI.
Section IV discusses the subsequent plan proposed by VMI to remedy
the consequences of its all-male admissions policy in line with the
courts' decisions.
Section V applies court decisions regarding gender-based classifications in education to the remedial plan. In this discussion, the
argument is made that VMI's plan is not sufficient to afford equal
protection to women who seek admission. Applying the analogy from
racial cases and the doctrines established in the gender cases, it is
argued that VMI's all-male admissions policy denies women equal
protection because it makes certain intangible factors inaccessible on
the basis of gender. Moreover, the proposed plan, under standards
established in gender-based classification precedent, does not
constitute means substantially related to the important governmental
interest of developing future leaders of society.
Section VI presents arguments that, in order to meet its burden
under intermediate scrutiny, VMI must integrate women. Coeducation is the substantially related means. It allows both men and
women to benefit equally from the intangible factors offered by an
education at VMI. In light of this analysis, the latter part of Section
VI addresses the ongoing VMI appeal and the important implications
this case may have on the Citadel case, also within the Fourth Circuit.
I. "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" AND EDUCATION-ITS HISTORY:
FROM START TO FINISH

The Supreme Court has a long history of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the Equal Protection Clause. A
substantial number of decisions, prior to the 1970s, focused on racial
equality. However, gender has now become a prominent area of the
equal rights discourse. In order to fully examine VMI's admissions

Mack Faragher & Florence Howe, eds., 1988); M. Elizabeth Tidball, Women's Colleges: Exceptional
Conditions, Not Exceptional Talent, ProducesHigh Achievers, in Educating The Majority-Women
Challenge Tradition in Higher Education 157 (Carol S. Pearson et al. eds., 1989); David B.
Truman, The Women's Movement and the Women's College, in WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION 56 (W.
Todd Furniss & Patricia Albjerg Graham, eds., 1974). See also infra note 172.
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policy and remedial plan, the historical basis of the separate but equal
doctrine and its subsequent rejection in racial education cases will be
discussed. As the notion of separate but equal weakened and was
replaced by the concept that separate was inherently unequal,
standards of scrutiny 7 became the means the Court employed to
ensure that racial classifications did not result in further separation
that violated the Equal Protection Clause. Section II will expand this
discussion, concentrating on how these constitutional theories have
developed and how they apply to gender cases.
A. SeparateBut Equal
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Pessy v. Ferguson.8 The Court's holding stated that
although the undoubted intent of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
ensure absolute racial equality before the law, "it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or [to enforce] a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.""9
The Court seemed to recognize that arbitrary discrimination would
not pass a constitutional test; thus, part of the decision is based on
whether segregation passed a reasonable test.20 In order to decide
that separation of accommodations based on race was reasonable, the
Court referred to "established usages, customs, and traditions of the
people" and considered "their comfort and the preservation of the
public peace and good order."2 The Court refused to require
commingling because it believed "[i]f the two races are to meet upon

17. The Court has articulated three levels of scrutiny that can be applied in constitutional
cases. First, strict scrutiny requires there be a compelling governmental interest, and the means
employed to achieve that interest must be narrowly tailored. Second, intermediate scrutiny
necessitates that the government interest be important, and that the state's means of
achievement be substantially related. Third, rational basis requires that the state have a
legitimate interest, and that its means of achievement have a fair and substantial relationship
to its interest. The origin of strict scrutiny's application to race was based on the notion that
racial minorities had been subject to invidious discrimination and must be protected in the
future. Intermediate scrutiny's origin in relation to gender will be discussed in more detail in
this article, but was based on the notion that gender was a suspect class and warranted some
protection, although not the same necessitated by invidious discrimination. See infra note 59.
18. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruledby Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated where separate
accommodations were provided for black train passengers because, although separate, the
accommodations were equal).
19. Pessy, 163 U.S. at 544. The Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the argument that
blacks now had equal political rights and social separation did not infringe on that essential
equality. Id. at 545.
20. I& at 550 (stating that all acts of police power must be reasonable and must be used
for the promotion of the public good, and not to oppress a particular class).
21. I&
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terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a
mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent
of individuals."2 2 Legislation cannot eliminate distinctions that are
made based on physical differences; and if legislation tries to abolish
classifications premised on these differences, the result will only be to
emphasize those differences.23 The Court, pointing to segregated
schools for support, reasoned that separating people based on race
did not necessarily imply inferiority.2 4
Justice Harlan dissented, expressing the view that the Constitution
is color-blind and recognizes no classes among citizens. 25 Recounting the history of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Justice Harlan stressed the inconsistency of the Court's
decisions. The same Court, which had just found in Pessy that
separate but equal did not violate the Constitution, had previously
found the following:
The words of the [Fourteenth] amendment

....

contain a

necessary implication of a positive immunity or right, most valuable
to the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored; exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening
the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy
26

Justice Harlan's contention with Pessy was that separate but equal did
not exemplify the freedom protected in those amendments because
27
it resulted in the degradation of a large class of fellow citizens.
Since Pessy, the preservation of equal rights based on race has been
challenged a great deal. The majority's opinion in Plessy now seems
archaic and Justice Harlan's dissent has become a prevailing view
among advocates of racial equality. Courts began combatting
discrimination by holding that schools must provide equal opportuni-

22. Id. at 551, overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Id.
24. Id.at 544. The Court cites the case of Roberts v. City of Boston (citation omitted), to
support its contention that equality does not mean men and women have the same civil and
political powers; rather, that equality means everyone is "equally entitled to the paternal
consideration and [paternal] protection of the law." Id at 544.
25. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. Id at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to decisions that held that prohibiting
citizens from becoming jurors because of their race violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
Justice Harlan also warned that the majority's decision would promote a belief that state
legislation could be used to defeat the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and, specifically,
the Equal Protection Clause. Id.at 560 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
27. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ties to all students." Eventually, the doctrine of separate but equal
was held to be inherently unequal.
B. IntangibleFactors and the Eradicationof Plessy
The Court, in reviewing racial segregation cases after Plessy, began
to formulate a new racial equality doctrine, specifically in education.
The doctrine rested on the concept that minorities - in separate but
equal facilities-were denied intangible factors, thereby making those
facilities inherently unequal and violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court did not have a preconceived idea of what constituted
intangible factors. Thus, the list developed over several years, based
on specific cases.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,29 decided
four years before Brown v. Board of Education3 0 began to establish the
importance of intangible factors in considerations of equal protection.
The Court in McLaurin started to delineate intangible factors, holding
that even segregation within an integrated school denied an individual the ability to study, to discuss and exchange viewpoints, and to
learn.3
McLaurin offers an excellent basis for comparison with the Virginia
Military Institute case because the Court specifically addressed the
significance of isolating members of society who seek to become
leaders. McLaurin sought to obtain a doctorate in education, a
degree that would invariably make him a leader of others. "Those
who will come under his guidance and influence must be directly
affected by the education he receives. Their own education and
development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is
unequal to that of his classmates."32 The Court held that by requiring the state to remove barriers to equal opportunities, it may not
eradicate all forms of prejudice, but it will ensure that an individual

28. These cases indicated that the application of a separate but equal doctrine would no
longer withstand judicial scrutiny. The cases that implicated the Pessy decision concerned
specifically the issue of education. SeeBrown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)
(Brown II); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) (holding that
separate is inherently unequal); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents For Higher Educ., 339
U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that when a black student is admitted to a traditionally white school,
that student must be given equal treatment in the school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
(providing a clear statement that the court neither reaffirmed nor overruled Plessy); Sipuel v.
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding that when there is only one state-sponsored law school
in a state, blacks must be admitted); Missouri ex re. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(holding that the state must remove barriers that deprive the opportunity for peer acceptance).
29. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
31. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
32. I&
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is not deprived of the chance to earn peer acceptance based on
individual merits.33 By having the opportunity and by not being
automatically classified and placed in a separate group, the level of
training and ability to lead will most likely improve.
3 4 also advanced the importance of intangible
Sweatt v. Painter
factors. In Sweatt v. Painter,a black man's application to law school
was denied solely based on race. The Supreme Court held that the
University of Texas Law School possesses-to a far greater degree
than the State law school established for Blacks-those qualities which
are incapable of objective measurement, but which make for greatness
in a law school."5 The Court highlighted such intangible factors as
reputation, administrative experience, position and influence of
alumni, standing in the community, traditions, and prestige. 6
Furthermore, the Court stated that few students would choose to
study in an environment that excludes the exchange of viewpoints
and that excludes from its population a large percentage of citizens
with whom those students must deal after graduation." The Court's
decision also emphasized that the rights to equal protection are
individual rights, not group rights; thus, the number of Black
applicants seeking admission to the law school should not be relevant
in the Court's consideration. 8
Brown v. Board ofEducationreinforced the decisions of McLaurinand
Sweatt. In Brown I, Black students sought to attend the white
elementary schools and high schools because the segregated schools
were not equal and deprived the students of their Fourteenth
Amendment rights 3 9 The Court described education as the "very

33. Id.at 641-42.

34. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
35. Id. at 634. Compared to the University of Texas Law School, the law school established
for blacks had a faculty of five full-time members (versus 16), a library of 16,500 volumes (versus
65,000), 23 students (versus 850), and only one alumnus who was a member of the Texas Bar.
Id.at 632-33.
36. Id.at 634.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 635. See also Missouri ex relGaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (reasoning
that equal rights is based on the individual). The Gaines Court would not consider the limited
demand for legal education among Blacks in Missouri as a means to justify discrimination by
whites. Id. at 350. The Court specifically found the argument that a constitutional right
depends on the number of persons discriminated against was without merit because the essence
of a constitutional right is that the right is personal. Id. at 351 (discussing McCabe v. Atchinson,
Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914)). The Court furthermore held that
unconstitutional discrimination, concerning the legal right to enjoy opportunities throughout
the State, cannot be resolved by requiring the individual to resort to another option, such as
attending school in another state; that resort may be mitigating, but it does validate the
constitutional violation. Id. at 350.
39. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1954) (Brown I).
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foundation of good citizenship"" and crucial to fulfilling public
duties, including military service." Moreover, education prepares
students to succeed in life and to adapt to environments in which they
are placed."2 The Court held that in public education separate was
inherently unequal because it denied all students access to intangible
4 In light
benefits, such as those expressed in Sweatt and McLaurin."
of this constitutional violation, the Court ordered desegregation."
II. GENDER AND EDUCATION: ANALOGY TO THE RACIAL DECISIONS
Brown's adoption of and assertion regarding the importance of
intangible factors did not end thejudiciary's grappling with this issue
in its constant protection of equal rights. Brown addressed race; but
race is only one area affected by the denial of intangible factors due
to constitutional violations. Gender has joined race in the quest to
attain equal protection. Jurisprudence in the area of gender has
followed a similar developmental history as race, but with some
variations."5
Gender presented the courts with a new dimension for interpreting
the separate but equal doctrine. Regardless of the indication by
previous decisions that separate but equal was no longer applicable,
the courts, including the Supreme Court, continued to vacillate in the
area of gender, from recognizing that the denial of intangible factors
invalidated separate but equal, to permitting exceptions to this
standard."6 The Court's formulation of intermediate scrutiny for

40. Id. at 493.
41. Id.
42. Id. Although the people to whom the Court's concern was addressed were elementary
and high school students, the principles of education apply uniformly to elementary school,
college, and post-graduate programs.
43. Id. at 493-95 (preventing the denial of intangible factors, such as the ability to study, to
discuss, to learn, as well as to gain the benefits of leadership opportunities, reputation and
tradition).
44. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
45. In looking at the history of the Equal Protection Clause, the argument is seldom put
forth that any part of the original purpose of the Clause was to prevent discrimination based on
gender. The protection gender receives from the Equal Protection Clause is a result of "a
judicially created extrapolation" from the body of law regarding racial discrimination. Allan
Ides, The Curious Case of the VirginiaMilitary Institute: An Essay on theJudicialFunction, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 35, 40 (1993). The incorporation of gender into the realm protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment was a result of the Court's interpretation of the Constitution based on
its perception of current societal values. "[T]he Court forced the preferences and innovations
of an evolving society into the Constitution, creating a new constitutional text that conformed
to emerging ideas about the proper roles of men and women." Id. at 42. The Court, however,
did not act inappropriately because the strength of the Constitution comes from the ability to
interpret it to resolve contemporary problems. Id.
46. SeeJon Allyn Soderberg, The Virginia MilitaryInstitute and the Equal Protection Clause: A
Factual and Legal Introduction, 50 WASH.& LEE L. REV. 15, 22 (1993) (indicating that despite
Brown's declaration that the separate but equal doctrine has no place in the educational sphere
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gender-based classifications indicated the necessity of close judicial
review to prevent a return to the days when separate but equal was
promoted unquestionably and when inherent inequalities were
ignored.
A. IntangibleFactors and Gender
Most of the cases involving gender, education, and equal protection
surfaced after the Court's decision in Brown. In 1958, a woman
sought admission to the all-male Texas A & M University on the basis
of convenience, not on the basis of wanting to pursue one of its
courses of study.47 The Court, in Heaton v. Bristol, ignored the
intangible factor that the most prestigious schools with the broadest
academic programs were usually all-male institutions;48 these intangible factors, however, were addressed in a later case, Kirstein v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia.49 Kirstein challenged the
University of Virginia's all-male admission policy, eventually resulting
in the court ordering the University to admit women.50 The court,
considering the intangible factors in Sweatt and McLaurin, held that
denying a qualified female admission to the most prestigious school
in Virginia violated equal protection.'
Williams v. McNair 2 decided twelve years after Heaton, relied on
the Kirstein court's approach. In Williams, the Supreme Court found
the exclusion of males from admission to Winthrop College was not
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and held that states can
create schools with different missions in order to promote educational

suggests that the doctrine is banned at all educational facilities, later decisions allowed
continued application of the doctrine when the classification was based on gender); William A.
Devan, Note, Toward A New StandardIn GenderDiscaimination:The Case of VirginiaMilitaryInstitute,
33 WM. & MARy L. REV. 489, 511 (1992) (explaining how the logical extrapolation would be to
deny single-sex schools from existing, the Brown decision was issued before the Court recognized
gender discrimination). See also MaryJordan, Citadel'sRampartsUnbreached,WASH. POsT,Jan. 13,
1994, at Al, A7 ("'It's time for women, [cadet Von Mickle] went on. Twenty years ago, blacks
couldn't go here.' Mickle said that as a black American, he felt he had to support Faulkner.
47. Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied,359 U.S. 230 (1959)
(cited in Bennett L. Saferstein, Revisiting Plessy At The VIrginia Military Institute: Reconciling
Single-Sex Education with Equal Protection,54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 637, 647, n.48 (1993)).
48. Saferstein, supranote 15, at 648.
49. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
50. Phillip Comer Griffeth, The Beat Goes On: DistrictCourt Upholds VirginiaMilitaryInstitute's
All-Male Admissions Policy in United States v. Virginia, 43 MERCER L. REV. 767, 779 (citing Kirstein
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 185-87 (E.D. Va. 1970)). This order
however, did not require all state-supported colleges to become co-educational. Id.
51. Saferstein, supra note 15, at 649 & n.59 (citing Kirstein, 309 F. Supp. at 186).
52. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), afid per curiam, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
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diversity.5 3 The Court, however, did not give the states unqualified
power. The Court held that the state's objective could be achieved
using gender classification only if no denial of tangible or intangible
factors occurred.5 4
Furthermore, the Court held that although the Equal Protection
Clause does not require identical treatment for all citizens, it does
prohibit classifications that are arbitrary and wanting in any rational
justification.5 5 This principle is reminiscent of the reasonable test
articulated in Plessy.
[T]he maintenance of two institutions for the sexes in South
Carolina, one for male warriors [the Citadel] and the other for
female domestics [Winthrop College], is different [from racially
segregated institutions] only in that the assumptions it reflects
about individual capabilities and aspirations are more widely
shared. The role of a housewife or a secretary is an honorable and
productive one; so of course is the role of a champion athlete or a
tenant farmer. To attack the attitudes reflected in the Williams
decision is not to denigrate the individuals for whom such
stereotypes happen to be accurate; it is to attack the arrogant
assumption that merely because these stereotypes are accurate for
some individuals, the state has a right to apply them to all individuthe need that
als-and, indeed, to shape its official policy toward 56

they shall continue to be accurate for all individuals.

53. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138 (D.S.C. 1970) (stating that "flexibility and
diversity in educational methods ... often are both desirable and beneficial; they should be
encouraged, not condemned").
54. Saferstein, supranote 15, at 650. The Court demonstrated in Kirstein and Williams that
the notion of "separate but equal," with regard to race, but not necessarily gender, inherently
violates the Equal Protection Clause because of a similar consideration of intangibles. As an
explanation for why a parallel argument could not be made here, the Court stated that at the
time of the Williams decision, the Court was not ready to adopt that rationale for gender.
Therefore, "[appellants] must build up the cases that all illustrate cogentlyjust how unequal
in fact are the opportunities for women." Susan C. Ross, The Wights of Women, in SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 995 (Barbara Allen Babcock et al. eds.,
1975).
55. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.S.C. 1970) ("(T]he Constitution does not
require that a classification 'keep abreast of the latest' in educational opinion, especially when
there remains a respectable opinion to the contrary; it only demands that the discrimination not
be wholly wanting in reason.").
56. Johnston & Knapp, Sex DiscriminationBy Law: A Study inJudicialPerspective, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 657,723-26 (1971), in SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1010-11
(Barbara Allen Babcock et al., eds., 1975). See also Catherine S. Manegold, Save the Males Becomes
Battle Cry In Citadel's Defense Against Woman, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at A10 (describing the
federal case that the U.S.Justice Department and a female applicant named Shannon Faulkner
are bringing against the state of South Carolina in opposition to the all-male admission standard
at The Citadel, the state's public military institution. In the district court's decision, Judge C.
Weston Houck referred to the VMI case when he stated that The Citadel must show that "South
Carolina's education policy is inherently different from Virginia's and [in doing so,] should not
be bound by the appellate court ruling [in the VMI case]").
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The Williams Court went on to give two related reasons why men were
not being denied equal protection and the benefit of intangible
factors. First, Winthrop was only one part of the entire system of
state-supported higher education and, thus, could not be viewed in
isolation. 7 Second, no unique feature was connected with Winthrop
that gave its students more of an educational advantage over any
student at another state-supported institution.58 As will be discussed
below, these two rationales are still asserted today. However, in the
case of VMI, they are not compelling.
B. The Development of IntermediateScrutiny
for Gender-Based Classifications
About the same time the Court affirmed Williams, it began to
recognize gender as a suspect class and to apply heightened scrutiny
to instances in which equal protection was denied. 9 The three
major equal protection cases are Reed v. Reed, 0 Frontiero v. Richardson,61 and Craig v. Boren.62 Over the next several years, the use of
intermediate scrutiny, which requires an important government goal
achieved by substantially related means, was developed by the Court
to ensure equal protection based on gender.
Classifications cannot be arbitrary; they must have a fair and
substantial relationship to the goal of the legislation in order to
ensure that all similarly situated individuals receive equal treatment.63 Giving mandatory preference to members of one sex over

57. Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 137.
58. Id at 138 (stating that the convenience of the proximity of a school is not a reason on
which to base a decision of whether to allow both sexes admission).
59. Race, on the other hand, has received strict scrutiny continuously. See, e.g., Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Race and gender are subject to different levels of scrutiny based on the distinction that racial
discrimination is usually the result of invidious stereotyping and animus, whereas gender
discrimination can be the result of genuine psychological and physiological differences.
Soderberg, supra note 46, at 20. "Through many battles in the courts, legislatures, and
businesses of America, women have made unprecedented progress in securing equal rights
under the law in the past thirty years. Society and the courts, however, have failed to reach the
same consensus regarding the place of gender under our Constitution as they have with respect
to race." Devan, supra note 46, at 489.
60. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that a statute giving preference to men over women, when
both apply to be administrator of an estate and have equal entitlement, violates equal
protection).
61. 411 U.S. 677 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that not allowing male spouses of
female military officers the same benefits as those given to female spouses violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
62. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a statute that prohibited males under the age of 21
from buying alcohol, but that prohibited females only until they reached 18, violated equal
protection).
63. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (citingRoyster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
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members of the other, simply to eliminate having to decide an issue
based on the merits, is exactly the kind of arbitrary legislative choice
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits."4 In these two declarations, the Court restated its concern with arbitrariness initially
expressed in Pessy. However, the Court no longer employed a
reasonableness standard as a solution, but required a higher level test:
an articulated relationship between legitimate goals and related
means.
In Frontiero, the Court raised the level of scrutiny. The Court
agreed that sex-based and race-based classifications were both
inherently suspect; and thus gender, like race, must be subjected to
close judicial scrutiny.65 Moreover, the Court declared sex and race
to be immutable characteristics that evidence no relation to the ability
to perform or contribute to society.66 Brennan took these similarities to their logical conclusion: if race is subject to strict scrutiny,
gender classification must be subjected not only to close, but strict,
judicial scrutiny. 67 This standard, however, prevailed for only a few
years.
Three years later, in Craigv. Boren, the Court stated that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objections."' The Court'relied extensively on Reed, stating that the 1971
decision was the foundation to invalidate other statutes that used
gender as a means for germane bases of classification.6 9 The
rationale applied in Reed, and subsequently adopted in Craig,

64. Id. (rejecting the Idaho Supreme Court's decision that a legislative method of avoiding
probate hearings was valid when it did not allow a woman to be the administrator of an estate,
when a man was also qualified for that position).
65. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion).
66. See i& at 686 (stating the immutable characteristics of sex and race should not be a basis
for the imposition of a disability because "legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility" (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
67. Id. at 688. It is suggested, however, thatJustice Stewart's vote and concurrence, based
on the invidious discrimination standard set out in Reed, struck down the notion of applying
strict scrutiny in favor of applying a lower, yet heightened standard, to these cases. Griffeth,
supra note 50, at 769; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (holding "[c]lassifications based upon
sex, like [those] upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny"). (Justice Ginsberg, however, has arguably
raised the issue again).
68. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The dissent in Craig expressed the sentiment that
gender-based discrimination should be reviewed under rational scrutiny. Id. at 217-18
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 198 (explaining that governmental entitlements could not be determined by
characterizations, such as the financial positions of service women in Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 689 n.23 (1972), and working women in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
643 (1975)).
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promoted the rejection of loose-fitting characterizations based on
outdated misconceptions of the role of women in the home and away
from the marketplace. Craigfurther asserted that laws based on weak
relationships between gender, and the stereotypical characteristics or
traits associated with that gender, were no longer tolerable.7" Thus,
the intermediate scrutiny became the standard of review for gender
classifications and, as it is the scrutiny applied today, it will be used in
Section V to evaluate VMI's Plan.
C. Application of IntermediateScrutiny and IntangibleFactors
to Gender Cases in the Field of Education
In the previous cases that held single-sex schools did not violate the
Constitution, the Supreme Court did not express a view on the
71
appropriate level of scrutiny to use in gender classification cases.
Within the next decade, however, the Court articulated its decision to
apply intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications. As a result,
other federal courts followed the heightened standard of review and
applied it in the context of education.
In Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,72 a female high
school student who was denied admission to an all-male academic
high school brought an action to challenge the constitutionality of the
exclusion. The female student was interested in an academic school,
which by definition offered only college preparatory courses, but only
two such schools existed.73 One was for males; the other was for
females. 74 The student's primary contention was that the academic
75
reputation at the male school exceeded that of the female school.
The district court issued an injunction, requiring that females be
admitted to the male school, based on the conclusion that the
gender-based exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to
the government's interest. 76 In considering the constitutional issues
and determining that the test to be applied was based on the notion
of a fair and substantial relationship between means and ends, the

70. Id at 199.
71. In both Williams and Heaton, the intermediate scrutiny test had not been articulated
and, therefore, was not applied. Griffeth, supra note 50, at 780; see also Devan, supra note 46,
at 513 (referring to the rejection of the separate but equal theory in Brown).
72. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
73. i& at 881. Philadelphia has four types of senior high schools, which can be categorized
as academic, comprehensive, technical, and magnet.
74. Id
75. Id at 882.
76. Vorchheimer 532 F.2d at 882. (finding the gender-based classification was not substantially
related to the government's interest in offering the educational alternative of sexually-segregated
high schools).
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district court reviewed Reed and Frontiero." The court of appeals,
rejecting plaintiff's reliance on cases that address race and education
(because race is held to strict scrutiny whereas gender is not), looked
instead to the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. McNair. The
court of appeals regarded that case as controlling on the issue of
denying the injunction. 78 The Willias standard of scrutiny was a
rational basis, since Reed had not been decided at that time. 79 The
court articulated, in Vorchheimer, that a legitimate educational policy
existed and could be served by means of single-gender schools, based
on the respected theories that adolescents may study more effectively
when they are separated.8" Thus, no constitutional violation existed.
The dissent, in criticizing the majority's holding, paraphrased from
Plessy to demonstrate the similarity between the 1896 opinion and the
1976 decision." The parallel is drawn between the two cases to
emphasize the dissent's concern that the majority has reverted back
to accepting separate but equal, even though that analysis in the field
of education had been eliminated from Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence with Brown.82 The dissent continued the parallel
between Vorchheimer and Pessy by emphasizing that the majority's
characterization of petitioner's choice as voluntary is equivalent to
Plessy's "voluntary" choice to ride the train.83
Since affirming McNair in 1971 and Vorchheimer v. School District of
Philadelphiain 1977, the Supreme Court did not address another

77. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1976), afjfd
per
curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (distinguishing Reed and Frontierobecause they involved situations
in which a female is deprived of a benefit that cannot be obtained elsewhere. In the case at bar,
however, the female student could have attended Girls High.).
78. Id. at 886-87 (justifying the intermediate scrutiny of gender classifications and the
stricter scrutiny of those based on race, the appeals court notes that "there are differences
between the sexes which may, in limited circumstances, justify disparity in law").
79. Id. at 887 (quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in Williams which stated that the
Constitution only requires a classification be "not wholly wanting in reason").
80. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd per
curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
81. Id. at 888 (Gibbons,J., dissenting) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)
(inserting semantical changes to make the decision in Plessy read as if it were written in 1976 by
the Vorchheimer majority)).
82. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 889 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). "The majority opinion, in
establishing a twentieth-century sexual equivalent to the Pessy decision, reminds us that the
doctrine can and will be invoked to support sexual discrimination in the same manner that it
supported racial discrimination prior to Brown." Id. The Court's rationale in Brown that the
educational arena had no room for separate but equal should also apply to the realm of military
education. Mary M. Cheh, An Essay On VM and Military Service: Yes, We Do Have To Be Equal
Together, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49, 55 (1993).
83. Vorchheimerv. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880,889 (Gibbons,J., dissenting),
affdpercuyiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). "The train Vorchhemier wants to ride is that of a rigorous
academic program among her intellectual peers ....Her choice, like Plessy's, is to submit to
segregation or refrain from availing herself of the service." Id.
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gender and education case until the Court revisited the issue in
Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan. In Hogan, a male nurse who
applied to the University's school of nursing was denied admission
based solely on gender.84 The Court's decision solidified the use of
intermediate scrutiny.8 5 In articulating this test in an educational
context, the Court addressed the prevention of continuing stereotypes
through classifications.8 6 If protecting members of one gender based
on the presumption that they are inherently handicapped is the
statute's objective, the statute would not pass the first prong of
judicial scrutiny.87
In making the determination, intermediate
scrutiny itself, "must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females."88
Under Hogan, in the area of gender and education, the purpose of
intermediate scrutiny, making the important goals and means
substantially related, is to ensure that reasoned analysis is used to
determine whether a gender-based classification is valid. Any other
kind of analysis would risk a "mechanical application [and consequent perpetuation] of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women." 9 The Court affirmed
the court of appeals' decision that the State did not meet its burden
under intermediate scrutiny. "The State had failed to show that
providing a unique education opportunity for females, but not for
males, bears a substantial relationship to that interest."9
Although the Court did not expressly state any reliance on an idea
of intangible factors, its decision reflects such consideration. As the
Court noted in Hogan, by guaranteeing that more women than men
are provided opportunities at state-supported nursing schools, it
reinforces old stereotypes suggesting that women, not men, should be

84. 458 U.S. 718, 719-23 (1982).
85. 1& at 724 (stating that the party seeking classification based on gender has the burden
of showing an exceedingly pervasive justification, a burden met only by establishing that the
discriminatory means are substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective). Justice O'Connor set forth the issue in gender discrimination cases as "not whether

the benefitted class profits from the classification, but whether the State's decision to confer a
benefit only upon one class by means of a discriminatory classification is substantially related to
achieving a legitimate and substantial goal." Id. at 731 n.17.
86. "Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic
and stereotypic notions." Id at 725.
87. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (concluding that,
despite the University's claim that its policy compensates for discrimination against women, the
actual effect of the policy is to perpetuate the stereotyped image of nursing as a woman's job).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 726. ContraPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (describing the rationale
of separating people based on usage, customs, and traditions).
90. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 722 (citing the Fifth Circuit's opinion, 646 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir.
1981)).
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nurses.9 The intangible factor realized and preserved by admitting
men to the university is the eradication of similar stereotypes. Thus,
in the area of gender, intangible factors have been given weight in an
equal protection analysis and separate facilities have been found to be
unconstitutional.9 2
A recent case that also addressed gender segregation in education
is Garrett v. Board of Education of the School District of Detroit.9 3 Garrett
concerned the opening of three male academies designed to offer
special programs emphasizing male responsibility. 4 The academies
had individual counseling and mentors, extended classroom hours,
and uniforms.9 5 The goal of the academies was to decrease high
unemployment rates and dropout levels and to help eliminate
homicide among urban males.9" The academies were challenged on
the basis that these goals, while important, did not necessitate an
all-male environment because they addressed issues that face all
students, male and female.97 In striking down the constitutionality
of the schools, the district court relied on Craig v. Boren which
disallowed the use of gender as "a proxy for other, more germane
bases for classification.""8 Under heightened scrutiny, the curriculum's emphasis on providing men with a vision and a plan for living,
helping them master their emotions, and assisting them in acquiring
skills and knowledge to overcome life's obstacles were found to be
important governmental interests; but, the exclusion of women was
not found to be a means substantially related to this objective.99 The
goal of keeping adolescents alive and out of prison was also impor-

91. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
92. It is important to note thatJustice Powell makes a direct reference to P/essy v. Ferguson
in his dissent: "Sexual segregation in education differs from the tradition, typified by the
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson [citation omitted], of separate but equal racial segregation. It was
characteristic of racial segregation that segregated facilities were offered, not as alternatives to
increase the choices available to blacks, but as the sole alternative." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 741 n.9
(Powell, J., dissenting). As I will argue later, these two bases for segregation may not be that
different because, even in the gender context, segregated facilities may be an individual's sole
alternative.
93. 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
94. I& at 1006. The programs included "rites of passage," an Afro-centric curriculum, and
lessons geared toward 21st century careers.
95. Id.
96. I&
97. See id. (also challenging the stated goals on the basis that "at-risk" males were not
targeted).
98. Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)).
99. Id. The defendant, however, argues that the schools have tried coeducation and that
it has failed to improve male performance. Id. The court did not support this argument
because, in the case where the schools succeeded, the success would be focused on the absence
of girls and not on the educational factors that are more likely to be responsible, Id.
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tant; but, again, the existence of all-male schools was not substantially
related to this goal.1" 0 Nothing has shown that the failure of the
education system to meet its goals is connected to the fact that males
and females attend school together. 01 Thus, relying on the standard expressed in Hogan,"2 the establishment of these schools
cannot pass intermediate scrutiny.
The judicial system has struggled to formulate a clearcut way to
analyze cases involving gender classification and education. Although
Hogan provides a more solid foundation for analysis, a close examination of all of the principles involved-equal protection, judicial
scrutiny, and intangible factors-is still needed. The rest of this
article will discuss the case of United States v. Virginia0 3 and will
analyze VMI's proposed plan in terms of these elements.

III. VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE:
DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS' DECISIONS
As indicated previously, the case of VMI's admissions policy has
been in the judicial system for several years. The case was first heard
in 1991, and since then has reached the appellate level and has been
remanded back to the district court where it was heard in January,
1994. 104
A. The Adversative EducationalModel
In 1991, the United States District Court of Virginia found that
VMI's all-male facility and admissions policy did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 0 5 The facts giving rise to this action were set
forth in the District Court's opinion.'
A female high school
student wanted to be considered for admission to VMI, but was

100. Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1006 (describing the standard as requiring that any gender-based classification
must serve an important governmental interest, and the means used must be substantially
related to those interests).
103. 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and remanded, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
104. O'Harrow, supranote 12, at E6. The result of this hearing was a decision issued by
Chief Judge Kiser on April 29, 1994. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va.
1994).
105. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991).
106. Facts concerning the public versus private nature of Virginia schools and the cost of
attending either kind are not discussed in this article. Such concerns are not fundamental to the
core of the equal protection argument being addressed. Moreover, the issue of the possibility
of allowing a private college to run a VMI-like program, and remain immunized from equal
protection challenges because the college is not part of the State, are resolved by provisions in
the plan proposed by VMI. See VMI Defendants' Proposed Remedial Plan, United States v.
Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), reh ; reh'g en banc denied and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431

(1993) [hereinafter VMI Plan].
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denied on the basis of her gender. Historically, VMI resisted
becoming coeducational in an effort to preserve its unique educational method."°7 VMI's method is based on the adversative model,
which involves "physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of
treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and
indoctrination in desirable values ...

."'0

Except at VMI, this

system of education is not offered anywhere in the United States; and
the school is often sought out by applicants because of its reputation
as the most challenging military school in the country.
The adversative model relies on several interdependent facets. The
class system's objective of developing leadership qualities is reached
through a program of privileges and responsibilities. Each cadet is
given specific responsibilities such as writing the standard operating
' 19
procedures for the first year students, supervising the "rat line,"
serving as a disciplinarian,"' and acting as a mentor to a specific
first year student.'1 ' A system of peer pressure is used to instill
VMI's values."' The VMI Honor Code controls all aspects of life, and
violations are penalized by one sanction: expulsion." 3 Another
central aspect of the unique VMI experience is the barracks arrangement, which provides the environment for cross-class relationships,
peer interaction, and administration of the class system and honor
code." 4 The barracks are designed with stark rooms, and the
windows and doors are always open. The purpose is to reduce all
cadets to the lowest level, and then instill the values and attitudes
expected from VMI's graduates."' The anticipated change in the

107. In promoting its uniqueness, VMI relied in part on its history and tradition, being
founded in 1839 and patterned after West Point. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1427.
However, West Point changed its traditions to accommodate the integration of women;
therefore, if VMI prides itself on being like the academy on which it was patterned, the logical
conclusion would be for VMI to change, also. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
108. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1421. The adversative model is employed to
its extreme through the "rat line," in which first year students are treated, as the name "rat"
suggests, as the lowest creature on earth. The training is comparable to Marine Corps boot
camp, declared to be more strenuous than Army boot camp. Id. at 1422.
109. See infra note 165 for a description of the "rat system."
110. This assignment is often considered part of the "dyke system," which seeks to create
cross-class bonding and give a model for leadership and support. United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407, 1423 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated by, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431, and on remand,United States v. Virginia,
852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
111. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1422-23.
112. Id.at 1423.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1423-24 (W.D. Va. 1991).
115. Id. at 1422. The conditions, which also include many cadets assigned to one room, poor
ventilation, and gang bathrooms, is intentional in order to place each cadet under constant
scrutiny, with no privacy, and to induce stress. led at 1424.
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barracks' culture is an additional and frequently stated explanation
for VMI's resistance to coeducation. 6
At trial, one expert testified how the adversative model forces a
student to know everything about himself: how far he can go with his
anger, and how much he can take when he is exhausted physically
and mentally." 7 Through this model, an individual completely
comprehends his limits and his capabilities, which is the basis of
leadership." ' "All of the experts agreed that the components which
make up the VMI system of encouraging leadership and character
development must be understood holistically. If any of the individual
systems were altered, it would affect the educational experience as a
whole."" 9
The mission of VMI states the following:
It is the mission of the Virginia Military Institute to produce
educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil
life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and
attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service,
advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system,
and ready as citizen-soldiers
to defend their country in time of
2
national peril.

1

In order to accomplish the desired results, the education at VMI is of
the highest quality. Regular undergraduate courses in liberal arts,
science, and engineering are complimented by military ROTC
programs as well as the unique system of military discipline. 2 In
conjunction with its mission, VMI stresses how its primary objective is
not only to teach men who foresee a career in the military, but rather
to develop character, and to prepare men for leadership positions in
22
any domain.
VMI considered its single-gender status prior to the present case.
In 1983, a committee was formed to examine the advantages,
disadvantages, and general effects of admitting women to VMI by

116. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1438 (W.D. Va. 1991). VMI contends that
the barracks would have to change to allow for privacy, which would contradict the notion of
community scrutiny. The honor code would, therefore, have less meaning because cadets could
act more secretly. On the contrary, I argue that the honor code would have more meaning
based exactly on the opportunities that secrecy makes available. The honor code is not tested
to its fullest if there is no opportunity to be dishonest based on an individual's fear as a result
of constant scrutiny by his peers.
117. Id. at 1421-22.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1422.
120. Id. at 1425.
121. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1424-1425 (W.D. Va. 1991).
122. Id.at 1426-27 (describing VMI's commitment to developing the "citizen-soldier").
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comparing VMI to other similar education institutions. 23 West
Point, upon which VMI was originally based, presented eleven factors
that favored coeducation:
(1) Attrition occurs for the same reason, regardless of gender;
(2) resentment is not prevalent and individual achievement forms
the basis of acceptance;
(3) VMI graduates will be at a disadvantage in the military, after
graduation, because the military is coed and they are accustomed
only to the single-gender military environment;
(4) the admission of women to West Point did not significantly
change the academy;
(5) women perform and compete as well as men in all training
programs;
(6) training can be altered to account for gender-based physical
differences without disrupting the character of the academy;
(7) physical education courses are the same for men and women
with the one exception of self-defense for women and boxing/wrestling for men;
(8) the cost of education was not affected by admitting women;
(9) going coeducational did not require changes in the curriculum,
procedures, or facilities;
(10) women have not encountered problems with the honor code;
and
(11) women have excelled at all levels of the West Point experience.

1 24

The examination of the United States Naval Academy revealed very
similar information to that provided by West Point. 12 5 A comparison
to Washington & Lee University provided the same result. Women
succeeded and, in fact, their admittance resulted in attracting better
qualified students that improved the overall quality of life at the
University.12 This comparison went on to recognize that changes
would inevitably have to occur if VMI became coeducational, but

123. Id. at 1427.
124. Id. at 1428.
125. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1428 (W.D. Va. 1991). The Air Force
Academy (AFA), however, which was not considered in the committee's study, found opposite
results. Although the AFA was originally supportive of the idea of coeducation, this support was
replaced by resentment based on the fact that women, due primarily to the nature of their
housing apart from their squadron, were spared interruptions and harassment. Devan, supra
note 46, at 525. In addition, the Naval Academy, although favoring coeducation, did recognize
the fine line that must be drawn between hazing that forms class bonding and conduct that
forms sexual harassment. Id. at 527.
126. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1429 (providing a statement by Dr. John D.
Wilson that the admittance of women at Washington & Lee was generally positive, while
admitting that such a change at VMI would necessitate certain modifications).
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those changes would not destroy the entire system.

127

The commit-

tee gained further insight by looking to the University of Virginia,
which indicated that coeducation was a positive experience resulting
in the strengthening of the school.1 2 1 Yet, even with this information, the committee found nothing that warranted VMI to admit
women. VMI held steadfastly1 29to the argument that admission of
women would alter its mission.
At the district court level, Virginia emphasized the physical and
developmental differences between men and women to justify
maintaining a single-sex policy. Physical comparisons were made
based on aerobic and lifting capacity, body fat, push-up and pull-up
capabilities, and susceptibility to injury. O Physical education, VMI
contended, would have to be altered based on inherent differences,
which would result also in the alteration of rat training. 31
Developmental differences were explored in more detail, emphasizing different needs and different means of learning.1 12 According
to VMI, males tend to need an adversative atmosphere, in which the
teacher is a disciplinarian and competitor, whereas females need a
cooperative atmosphere, in which the teacher emotionally connects
with the students. 33 Although this theory seems to dominate the
findings of facts, one expert conceded that some women can thrive
VMI also argued that a
in an adversative environment." 4
single-gender environment, for men, eliminates sexual tension that
would be created with the presence of women.1 35 Relationships
between the sexes would affect the nature of the VMI experience
because it would lead to jealousies and aspirations that work against
the central notion of complete equality.136 As VMI further contended, in general, single-gender education has been shown, through
research, to benefit both sexes based on increased academic involve-

127. Id.
128. Id (demonstrating how "contrary to expectations, female students at the University [of
Virginia] tend to enroll in the strongest departments and superior programs including
engineering and architecture").
129. Id.at 1429-30 (considering the reasons that other institutions changed to coeducational,
VMI found that none of the motivating factors of other institutions applied to them).
130. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432-33 (W.D. Va. 1991).
131. Id. at 1438 (describing a physical education program as a part of a proposed remedial
plan).
132. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
133. Id. at 1434.
134. Id. The expert, however, remarked how women who thrive under an adversative model
are the exception.
135. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1435 (W.D. Va. 1991). The opposite
gender is implicated as a distraction and a source of dissipating energy that could be otherwise
spent pursuing educational opportunities. Id.
136. Id. at 1440.
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ment, faculty interaction, and increased self-esteem.' Furthermore,
the research used by VMI also indicated additional benefits, namely
that careers of men who graduated from single-gender schools tended
to focus on law, business and college teaching, thus positively affecting
their starting salaries. It further alleged that women who graduated
from single-gender schools assumed leadership positions and aspired
to advanced degrees, presumably increasing their starting salaries.'
Because some minor accommodations would have to be made with
the admission of women, VMI argued that absolute equality of
treatment would also be changed to a standard based on fairness of
treatment due to the physiological, psychological, and sociological
differences of the two genders. 39
VMI maintained that these
changes would drastically alter the VMI experience, and that
gender-based classification to preserve this element was appropriate.
B. The Opinion of the District Court of Virginia
Applying the Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test-requiring
an important governmental objective be met by substantially related
means-the District Court seemed to reason that preventing the
alteration of key elements of VMI's educational system because of the
admittance of females was a governmental goal sufficient to satisfy the
first part of the test. 4 ' Moreover, the diversity provided by the
single-gender experience offered at VMI was seen as a second
14
governmental goal that could withstand intermediate scrutiny. '
The means, single-sex education, by which these goals were achieved
was, according to the district court, substantially related and survived
constitutional scrutiny.'42

137. Id. at 1435. (citing Alexander Astin, Four Critical Years, (1977)). These factors may be
considered by some proponents of the plan to be intangible aspects of single-sex education that
would be denied ifVMI was forced to integrate women. To the contrary, these benefits can still
be taken advantage of at coeducational institutions. Although they may not be attained to the
same degree, if the current system is left intact with the additional separate program, other
intangible benefits exist that are not available to any degree through the proposed segregated
system.
138. Id. Another study indicates that students from single-sex colleges may be more likely
to pursue careers traditionally associated with the opposite sex. United States v. Virginia, 766
F. Supp. 1407,1435 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Marvin Bressler & PeterWendell, The Sex Composition
ofSelective Colleges and GenderDifferencesin CareerAspirations,51J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 650 (1980)).
139. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1439.
140. Id. at 1411. The district court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's articulation of
intermediate scrutiny in Mississippi University forWomen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), which
will be discussed in further detail in Section V. The court also refers to Williams v. McNair to
support its opinion that gender segregated institutions may be permissible.
141. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-13 (W.D. Va. 1991).
142. Id. at 1414-15. In fact, Judge Kiser states that the means can benefit both genders. Id.
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C. The Opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the issue of single-gender education at VMI. 143 The court
of appeals also recognized VMI's unique educational method as an
important governmental objective and upheld the single-gender
The court,
admissions policy as a substantially related means."4
however, added an important distinction. It did not agree that the
existence of this objective warranted limiting this opportunity to only
the single gender of males.145 Ultimately, the case was remanded
to the district court. The Commonwealth, consequently, was required
to choose one of three alternatives: admit women; give up its state
support of VMI; or develop a plan that would meet the principles of
equal protection set forth in the court of appeal's decision.14 6 The
submit it to the
Commonwealth decided to develop the plan and
147
district court for adoption and implementation.
In reaching a decision, the court of appeals established its
perception of equal protection principles by stating that the Equal
Protection Clause did not intend to eliminate all differences between
individuals. 4 8 In undertaking an equal protection analysis, the
court had to decide whether the class of persons targeted by a state
regulation is defined so that the class' relationship to the purpose of
the regulation is fair and substantial. 149 The court of appeals
determined that "[i]t is not the maleness, as distinguished from
femaleness, that provides justification for the program. It is the
homogeneity of gender in the process, regardless of which gender is
considered, that has been shown to be related to the essence of the
education and training at VMI."15 0 Thus, the court of appeals
seemed to suggest that single gender institutions could pass intermediate scrutiny, but only if both genders had substantially the same
opportunity available to them.
The diversity argument, advanced by the lower court's decision-that VMI allowed an additional and different educational
opportunity-did not satisfy the court of appeals. A policy of diversity
which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 892.
Id.
I&
Id
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id (relying on Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)).
Id. at 897.

JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW

[Vol. 3:69

single-gender institutions, must do more than favor one gender.'
In other words, VMI had not established how limiting this experience
to men, without providing any opportunity-single-gender or coeducational for women-was substantially related to achieving its goals. The
court of appeals, therefore, remanded the case to the district court
and allowed VMI the option of admitting women, giving up its state
support, or formulating a similar program for women.
IV. VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN

In September, 1993, VMI chose the option of establishing a parallel
program for women and submitted its remedial plan ("the Plan") to
the United States District Court, Western District of Virginia." 2 The
Plan proposed means to provide college-age women a state-supported,
single-gender educational program that would resemble VMI in its
preparation of leaders for civilian and military life. The program,
however, would be located off-site at Mary Baldwin College in
Staunton, Virginia.
The creation of a separate educational program for women under
that
the Plan is based on the court of appeals' perception
single-gender education may be justified when an institution such as
VMI offers its program in a holistic educational environment and the
inevitable destruction of that environment would result if VMI were
to admit women.' 53 The Plan further relies on the notion that
single-gender programs particularly benefit women, who otherwise
may be denied leadership opportunities in coeducational institu54
tions.1

151. Id. at 899.
152. VMI Plan, Supra note 106. In a South Carolina case in which a 19-year-old woman sued
to be the first female student in the military college's all-male corps, the Citadel was ordered to
allow Shannon Faulkner to attend classes startingJanuary, 1994, while it develops a plan for a
parallel program for housing, clothing and feeding a woman at their academy. The Citadel, the
only other all-male, public military college in the nation besides VMI, initially indicated it would
propose a program similar to that of the Mary Baldwin Institute for leadership proposed byVMI.
The Court has requested a final proposed plan from the Citadel by the end of July, 1994.
Eichel, supra note 4, at Al. See also Citadel'sFaliback Position: No Females in Cadet Corps, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 3,1994, atA10 (describing the Citadel's ten-page plan which suggested three options:
sending students to military institutions out-of-state, giving support to private women's schools,
or having co-educational cadet corps at another state school).
153. VMI Plan, supra, note 106, at 1. The court of appeals remarked on (and the Institute
reiterated in its proposed Plan) the Catch-22 situation that is presented to VMI because the
members of the opposite sex who desire the VMI experience, would-by the nature of their
presence-alter that experience due to the accommodations that would have to be made.
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992); VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 2.
154. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 3. The U.S. government argued in the course of this
action that VMI is a state-supported school and thus is subject to certain requirements in the
interest of equal protection. Mary Baldwin, however, is a private college and some commentators suggest this immunizes Mary Baldwin from equal protection claims. This status does not
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VMI's Plan proposes to establish a unique, innovative, and statesupported leadership program at Mary Baldwin College, an all-female,
private school. The underlying mission of this leadership program
parallels VMI's mission: to produce women as citizen-soldiers through
physical and mental rigor and other unspecified components. 155 To
further simulate VMI, the proposed program would offer women the
chance to partake in a co-educational military component through
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 55 The Plan is
designed to provide women a comparable physical and mental
single-gender program. The program is also specifically designed to
develop women as leaders and to give women a coeducational military
experience similar to that which would be offered by VMI, if VMI
7
became coeducational.

15

The Plan is based on the establishment of a four-year residential
undergraduate program at Mary Baldwin College, entitled Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("Institute for Leadership").s
The mission of the Institute for Leadership purports to be "comparable to and derived from" VMI's mission.'5 9 However, to achieve the
mission, Mary Baldwin will adopt only some of VMI's educational
systems, and with gender-based differences within some of those

change VMI's obligation to ensure that women are given equal rights because Mary Baldwin will
be contracting with the state to receive funding for this program, thereby intertwining itself with
the state and becoming subject to its constitutional requirements. Educating students in both
educational curriculum and in military training constitutes a dual function that is traditionally
a governmental function, indicating that such schools are state actors regardless of their private
status. Berman, supranote 15, at 228-29. This paper does not address whether Mary Baldwin
is immunized from the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause; it is assumed that the
college is not (based on Berman's argument alone). See also Note, State Action, Private Colleges,
and Sex Segregation, in Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies, supra note 54 at
997, 998 (stating that if a private college is intermingling with a public institution or with the
state-such as through receiving financial support or by exercising a traditionally governmental
power-it can be considered public for the purpose of reviewing certain policies). See also supra
note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the assumption of leadership positions by women
graduates of single-gender schools).
155. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 3.
156. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 3. The Plan suggests that this offering further ensures that
women could participate in a holistic program.
157. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 3.
158. VMI Plan, supra note 106, at 6. VMI will give Institute for Leadership brochures and
application forms to females who are interested in VMI and will forward these inquiries to Mary
Baldwin. Mary Baldwin, in turn, will provide VMI admissions information to any males who
express an interest in Mary Baldwin College. It. at 14. However, Dr. Cynthia Tyson, president
of Mary Baldwin College, stated they have never had inquiries from male applicants. Telephone
Interview with Dr. Cynthia Tyson, President, Mary Baldwin College (Oct. 11, 1993).
159. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 7. The mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers who are
educated and honorable women, prepared for the varied work of civil life, qualified to serve in
the armed forces, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of
leadership, and possessing a high sense of public service." It.
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systems. 6 ' These systems include a curriculum of traditional liberal
arts and sciences, as well as course offerings that focus on leadership
in business, government service, volunteerism, interpersonal communication, organizational behavior, ethics, and mediation. 6 ' The
Institute for Leadership will also adopt the following: military training
through cross-enrollment with other ROTC programs, an honor code,
62 a residential system, 163
a mentoring system, physical training,
extracurricular programs, orientation programs, and externship
opportunities. 164
One of the major differences between VMI and the proposed Plan
at Mary Baldwin is the elimination of the "rat system." 65 This
adversative model is not included for women because it was determined to be unsuitable for the majority of female students, even
though it is conducive to the development of confidence and
self-esteem in men.1 6 The Institute for Leadership maintains that
the mental toughness objective achieved at VMI through the rat
system will be attained at Mary Baldwin through the combination of
67
its other programs.
In the Plan, VMI emphasizes that it does not seek to achieve a
separate but equal program, but strives to provide a distinct and
superior program for women using methods that meet their specific

160. See VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 8-12.
161. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 8.
162. Although the requirement of eight semesters of a physical education program would
be the same for men at VMI and women at Mary Baldwin, the level of rigor that must be met
for women is different from that of men, based on gender-based differences. This training will
also include confidence-building exercises and an obstacle course. VMI Plan, supra note 152,
at 10.
163. The residential system, however, is altered to promote esprit de corps, leadership, and
mentoring not gained through the military atmosphere associated with barracks. VMI Plan,
supra note 152, at 11.
164. See VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 8-12.
165. The court of appeals described the rat system as "the harsh orientation process to which
all new cadets ('rats') are subjected during their first seven months at VMI. Designed to be
comparable to the Marine Corps' boot camp in terms of physical rigor and mental stress, the
rat line includes indoctrination, minute regulation ofindividual behavior, frequent punishments,
rigorous physical education, and military drills." United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 893
(4th Cir. 1992).
166. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 4-5. The Plan argues that a program based on the
adversative model would attract few females and would benefit even fewer of them. Id. at 5.
This consideration, however, does not have merit as will be discussed in section V.
167. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 10 (specifying the Institute for Leadership's cadre week,
rigorous physical training program, student-regulated residence hall life, honor code, ROTC
program, and intensive academic program). However, if all the other systems are so similar to
VMI as to make the experience equal at both institutions, it is unclear why VMI is so concerned
about maintaining its own rat system? "The combination of these systems will achieve the same
results.., as the rat training system in the development of mental discipline and the capacity
to solve problems...." VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 10.

Fall 1994]

UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA

Virginia contends that the Plan solves the problem
needs."6
created by the absence of a VMI-type program for women and
represents a creative option that not only provides women a superior
eduction, but also achieves the State's goal of diversity in higher
education and of training future leaders. 69 As such, VMI maintains
170
that the Plan does not violate any element of equal protection.
V. GENDER, EDUCATION, INTANGIBLE FACTORS,
AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: APPLICATION TO VIRGINIA MILITARY
INSTITUTE'S REMEDIAL PLAN

The Plan does not resolve VMI's violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. A close examination of the proposed Plan will show that the
separate institution at Mary Baldwin denies women from receiving
equal benefits of intangible factors based on gender classification, and
it does not meet the standards of intermediate scrutiny. The
following analysis flows from the historical and parallel trend-in
cases of race-based segregation in education-that practices once
considered separate but equal are now found to be inherently
Additionally, the analysis takes into account the differunequal.'
ences between the two constitutional approaches. In the context of
gender, the focus is two-fold: whether separate institutions deny
women intangible factors172 that are provided to men, and whether
gender-based segregation passes intermediate scrutiny.
168. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 4; Telephone Interview with Dr. Cynthia Tyson, President,
Mary Baldwin College (Oct. 11, 1993).
169. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 19.
170. VMI Plan, supranote 152, at 2, 19. The U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ") objects to
the Plan based on violations of equal protection; specifically, DOJ argues that the plan "omits
the essential components and benefits of the unique VMI experience" and "it designs programs
based on gender stereotypes." United States' Opposition and Response to the VMI Defendants'
Proposed Remedial Plan 1, 1, United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), (No. 900126-R) (filed Nov. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Opposition]. DOJ concludes its argument by stating
that because VMI has failed to demonstrate a constitutionally adequate alternative to its present
program, VMI should be required to fully integrate women. Id. at 2-3.
171. See supranotes 45-70 and accompanying text. It is important to reiterate that Mary
Baldwin does not assert this plan creates a separate but equal facility. On the contrary, the Plan
is considered to establish a "distinct and superior" program for women. VMI Plan, supra note
152, at 4. On remand, the District Court rejected the proposition that the Court of Appeals
would be satisfied with a Plan that offered a separate but equal alternative. "[I]f 'separate but
equal' is the standard by which the Commonwealth's plan must be measured, then it surely must
fail because, as the United States pointed out time and time again during the trial, even if all
else were equal between VMI and the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), the
VWIL program cannot supply those intangible qualities of history, reputation, tradition, and
prestige that VMI has amassed over the years." 852 F. Supp. 471, 475 (W.D. Va. 1994).
Regardless of the different labels, equal or superior, the consequences are the same: women
are separated from men based solely on gender.
172. In United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), the court relied on
research indicating that certain benefits can be derived from singie-sex education that cannot
be gained from coeducation. Id. at 1411-12, vacated by, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
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A. Intangible Factorsand Virginia Military Institute"
"[A] s courts have recognized in other contexts, educational quality

Virginia Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431, and on remand, United States v. Virginia,
852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994). Although proponents of sexual segregation deny the
similarities between the race equivalent cases, the court's reliance on this social science research
is strikingly similar to the sociological evidence used in Brown I to determine that racially
segregated schools were inherently unequal and that segregation effected intangible factors.
Saferstein, supranote 15, at 640 n.13; see also Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
495 (1954) (Brown I) (emphasizing the importance of intangible factors in Equal Protection
case analysis). It seems ironic, however, that in Brown Ia study was used to show the negative
effects of segregation and to support the contention that desegregation was necessary; yet, in
VMI, an empirical study is being used to show that segregation, based on gender, is more
beneficial. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-94. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412
(W.D. Va. 1991); see also Saferstein, supra note 15, at 657. By viewing single-sex education as
beneficial for both men and women, the court in VMI did not consider that women's goals of
higher education might be due to exceptional academic experiences, and men's goals of career
opportunities might be the result of 'old boys' networks." Saferstein, supra note 46, at 657 n.99.
173. Two cases have specifically addressed the issue of gender-based classification as it relates
to admission to military academies. These cases sandwich the Court's decision in Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982), which set intermediate scrutiny as the level of review for gender-based
discrimination. Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974), preceded Hogan and
United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1985), succeeded it.
The governmental interest at issue in these cases was upholding the policy that women could
not undertake combat positions; the means was excluding them from military schools. Waldie,
509 F.2d at 509; MassachusettsMaritimeAcademy, 762 F.2d at 153. This interest is not a concern
in the VMI case, but a brief look at the two decisions reinforces the use of the intermediate
scrutiny test in the context of gender, education, and military academies.
Waldie presented three issues involving gender-based discrimination in a military context: 1)
the proper level of deference the courts should give Congress on military affairs; 2) the
adequate protection of constitutional guarantees despite military concerns; and 3) the level of
review that should be used for gender-based distinctions. Ponte, supra note 15, at 1141. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, focusing on the
constitutionality ofsingle-sex admission policies at military academies, rejected the district court's
application of the rational basis test. Id. However, it did not apply a heightened scrutiny
because no such standard had been clearly articulated. Id. at 1140-41 n.20 (citing Waldi 509
F.2d 508, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The Waldie court suggested that the standard for testing
sex-based equal protection claims was still developing and depended on the facts of each
particular case. Ponte, supra note 15, at 1143 n.31. As a result, the facts were essential to
determine whether distinctions were based on sex-stereotypes or on justifiable government
objectives. Id. at 1143.
MassachusettsMaritimeAcademy, in admitting women, rejected both the argument that women
could not be involved in combat and the argument their exclusion from military academies
furthered the important government objective of national defense. 762 F.2d at 153; see also
Ponte, supra note 15, at 1158. Due to the statutory and regulatory revisions from Congress that
required federal military academies to admit women, men and women were now similarly
situated for recruitment, admissions, training, and commissioning at the academies and colleges.
Ponte, supra note 15, at 1159; Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d at 153. Massachusetts
Maritime Academy is important in the development of gender-based standards to determine
discrimination, especially in military colleges and academies. It signifies a merger between the
heightened scrutiny test and legislative revisions. Ponte, supra note 15, at 1160. In Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, the court applied heightened scrutiny and held that this same standard of
review should be applied in gender-based claims regardless of whether the academies are federal
or state. Ponte, supranote 15 at 1158; MassachusettsMaritime Academy, 762 F.2d at 152-53. In
light of the developing case law and legislative changes, the argument has been made that all
military academies should be coeducational; and thus, those colleges that have not yet admitted
women are in violation of equal protection guarantees. Ponte, supra note 15, at 1160.
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rests on a host of intangible and to some extent incommensurable
factors regarding reputation, learning environment, and socialization
patterns."'7 4 Although previous analyses of the current Virginia case
speculated that intangible factors consist of the prestige and strength
of the alumni of VMI as well as the tradition and history of the
school, 175 these are no longer as questionable given the reputation,
alumni strength, tradition, and history of Mary Baldwin College.
Nonetheless, other intangible factors exist which are not provided
equally to men and women under the Plan.
Courts are continuously engaged in defining what constitutes an
intangible factor. Generalized terms, such as learning environment
and socialization patterns, provide some guidance. Considering these
broad categories, the Court should recognize the following intangible
factors: the benefit of a holistic experience; informal learning and
interaction among classmates; the elimination of, and the prevention
of perpetuating traditional gender stereotypes; and the realization of
empowerment. These factors are equally as important as those factors
listed in the Supreme Court's previous decisions. Consequently, these
intangibles warrant the application of heightened scrutiny to ensure
that they are provided equally to members of both sexes. Under
intermediate scrutiny, therefore, VMI's proposed plan should fail.
1. HolisticExperience
The idea of gaining a complete educational experience often lies
at the heart of an equal protection analysis examining the benefits of
intangible factors in the educational context. No court decision has
considered a school's holistic experience in and of itself an intangible
factor. In the present case, however, the holistic educational
experience of VMI is a separate intangible factor that women do not
receive under the exclusionary admissions policy nor under the
proposed plan.
A holistic experience emphasizes the importance of the entirety and
focuses on the interdependence of the parts; the primary concern lies
on" the whole and does not concentrate on the dissection of that
whole into its separate components.1 6 The VMI experience offers
a unique combination of an adversative model of education, an
174. Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U. L. REv. 106, 138 (1986)
(citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)). The author also argues that consideration
of intangible factors can explain why the court's decision in Vorchhemier is inadequate. Id.
175. See generally Cheh, supranote 82, at 51; Griffeth, supra note 50, at 772-74; Ides, supra note
45 at 45; Saferstein, supra note 15, at 659-66; Soderberg, supra note 46 at 17-18; Devan, supra
note 46, at 494.
176. WEBSTER'S II DICIONARY 587 (1988).
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egalitarian ideal of absolute equality of treatment, an intense physical
program, an absence of privacy, and strict regulation of behavior
These
through military discipline and through the honor code.'
elements exist in conjunction with a strong extra-curricular program
and a unique residential system. Moreover, VMI's faculty and facilities
are dedicated completely to the success of the program. VMI's
resources are invested solely in this program; The one and only
community is concerned is
objective with which the entire VMI
78
developing leaders, citizen-soldiers.
Women cannot experience VMI's unique combination of factors
elsewhere because no other institute provides the same military,
educational, and developmental experience1 79 The Plan suggests
that the new program at Mary Baldwin provides this same holistic
program by providing opportunities for both a strong education at
Mary Baldwin and military training at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 18 and by placing emphasis on leadership development.'8
The Plan does not, however, remedy the unconstitutional infringement of equal protection because it does not provide the crucial
combination of the many facets of a VMI education that is the crux
of this intangible factor. First, the Plan specifically excludes the
adversative model and the absence of privacy from its program.1 82
In addition, the Plan's structure, by its very design, separates the
curriculum, disciplinary procedures, leadership development,
extra-curricular activities, mentoring, residence requirements, and the
honor code into distinct spheres.
The curriculum, as it relates to specific courses, is important at
VMI; but it encompasses other elements. The VMI educational
curriculum is "conducted in, and facilitated by, the unique VMI
system of military discipline."183 In addition, VMI's leadership

177. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13; Griffeth, supranote 49, at 772-74;
Saferstein, supra note 15, at 659-66;
178. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 1 (stating the purpose of the VMI Proposed Remedial
Plan).
179. See Berman, supra note 15, at 221 (arguing that the lack of access to VMI for females
was not the true issue, rather the issue was the lack of an all-female counterpart to VMI),
180. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 3 (describing the purpose of the Plan: to provide women
with the educational choices of a single-gender program designed exclusively for women, or a
coeducational program at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).
181. Again, one argument in support of the Plan contends that the leadership program at
Mary Baldwin does not strive to be separate but equal, rather it strives to be distinct and
superior. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 4. Telephone Interview with Dr. Cynthia Tyson,
President, Mary Baldwin College (Oct. 11, 1993).
182. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 4-5, 10-11 (discussing how the adversative model and the
constant scrutiny of a barracks is not conducive for developing self-esteem in women).
183. Opposition, supra, note 170, at 22 (quoting Virginia Military Institute 1993-1994
Catalogue at 3).
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development is achieved through its holistic method that cuts across
specific courses."' The Plan, on the other hand, proposes that
students must complete core and elective courses in leadership."' 5
Mary Baldwin's approach places the focus of leadership development
on leadership
mostly in the classroom whereas VMI's method focuses
18 6
life.
student's
the
of
aspects
all
in
development
At VMI, extra-curricular activities are a serious part of the curriculum.187 Extra-curricular activities at Mary Baldwin, however, would
include students who are not part of the program. These activities
must then cater to the needs of a student body which is not immersed
in the leadership program. Furthermore, it is likely that other
students would not undertake these activities with the same degree of
seriousness as the cadets at VMI, thereby depriving the Institute for
Leadership students of a comparable experience. This emphasizes,
again, that at Mary Baldwin this program is only one of a vast number
of activities being offered.'88
The structured mentoring process at Mary Baldwin is also not the
same as the systems imposed at VMI. Without the rat line or dyke
system, the same degree of pressure and stress is not present. It is
these elements that lead to self-control, self-discipline, and selflessness
for the good of a unit that VMI contends is necessary for leadership
in combat.' 89
Men at VMI live together in stark, uncomfortable barracks,
arranged so every movement can be seen. Although the Plan
recognizes the need for women enrolled in the program to live
together, the character of dormitory life does not equal the character
of barracks life. Women, therefore, are deprived of another element

184. Opposition, supra note 170, at 23.
185. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 8 (highlighting topics under consideration including
"Issues of Leadership in Business, Government and Voluntary Service; Interpersonal
Communication; Organizational Behavior; Ethics; Mediation; and Issues of Women and
Leadership.").
186. Opposition, supra note 170, at 24 (discussing the stark contrast between providing
leadership training on-post the way VMI does versus relegating a large component of leadership
training to the classroom the way Mary Baldwin's approach would).
187. Opposition, supranote 170, at 30-31 (explaining the significance of "extra curricular"
activities at VMI). In addition, as part of the entire training, VMI houses unique physical
training facilities that it has offered to share for one week of orientation. During the rest of the
year, Mary Baldwin students do not have access to them. Id. at 20.
188. Opposition, supra note 170, at 30-31 (listing examples of "non-serious" activities offered
at Mary Baldwin such as "Apple DayJunior Dad's Weekend, Parents' Weekend and Commencement Ball").
189. Opposition, supra note 170, at 27.
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of the entire experience-the constant scrutiny and minute regulation
of behavior considered essential to the VMI system.'
The honor code also differs. At VMI, one violation of the honor
code results in expulsion. At Mary Baldwin, however, students who
violate the honor code are subject to varying degrees of punishment,
not automatic expulsion.''
The lack of a holistic experience is also exemplified by the
allocation of resources at Mary Baldwin. Mary Baldwin College would
offer the leadership program as only one of the many undergraduate
programs available to its students. Resources and administrative
energy cannot be focused solely on this leadership program. It is
merely one aspect of the vast curriculum offered by the college. Mary
Baldwin's course curriculum focuses on literature, arts and science,
and does not offer any engineering course, which VMI does provide.
The creation of this separate program does not meet the requirements of equal protection. 9 ' Again, it is the combination and
interdependence of these factors that provides the foundation of the
intangible benefit of a holistic VMI education.
The holistic experience is undeniably an important benefit of VMI,
as indicated by the numerous references made by VMI itself to the
holistic nature of its education.'
Furthermore, the justification for
creating a program at Mary Baldwin College is premised on the
opinion that making VMI coeducation would "tear at the fabric of the
college's holistic educational methodology."'9 4 Thus, rather than
destroy the benefit for men, women are excluded and denied the
equal opportunity of that holistic experience. As a result women do
not receive the intangible benefits of a VMI education-that unique
combination of developmental factors and complete devotion of the
faculty and other students to their experience.

190. Opposition, supra note 170, at 29. The argument in support of dormitory living is that
barracks living would be inappropriate for women. See supra notes 116 and 165.
191. Opposition, supranote 170, at 25-26 (explaining that Mary Baldwin's program separates
violations into "major" and "minor" categories with such categorization to be determined by the
students on a case-by-case basis).
192. See generallyInner-City Schools, supra note 15, at 1746-49 (discussing intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause and Vorchheimer and the idea that allocation of resources
poses the danger of unfair treatment). Resources at Mary Baldwin College would not be
allocated in the same manner as at VMI, even considering its contract with the State.
193. See generally VMI Plan, supranote 152 passim (emphasizing throughout the importance
of the holistic program at VMI).
194. VMI Plan, supra note 152, at 2 (stating the court's opinion that "members of the
opposite sex who are denied the opportunity to attend a college such as VMI, cannot obtain the
educational benefits of that college's program because their admission would destroy the singlegender environment which is the key to the success of the educational program").

Fall 1994]

UNITED STATES V. VIRGINIA

2. Informal LearningFrom and Interaction With Peers
McLaurin, Sweatt, and Brown195 recognized informal learning and
interaction as important intangible factors that cannot be achieved
through separate institutions, even if the premise is that the schools
are equal. Virginia initially claimed that VMI's all-male institute
provided diverse educational choices within the system of higher
education to its students, thereby promoting an important governmental aim. That aim is not met, however, by segregating men and
women based on gender. Segregation deprives students of the benefit
of informal learning among classmates who are themselves diverse. 9'
The rationale that coeducation better prepares students
for the real world is legitimate and important.1 97 Coeducation is
important because it provides "an educational environment that
mirrors the diversity of modem society."' If VMI became coeducational, it would allow women and men to benefit equally from the
advantages of learning among a student body diverse in views.
The nature and ambiance of classrooms would unquestionably
change upon the admission of females to a previously all-male
environment; but if women continue to be excluded, a distinct quality
is lost in everyone's educational experience.'9 9 One of the criteria
established in McLaurin was that being separated diminished the
student's ability to discuss different viewpoints with other students. 00
"If VMI claims a military mission, it should prepare its cadets to
deal with realities of a mixed-gender military. ' 20 1 If women are
going to be leaders in a society in which they must associate with
men, and vice versa, then their ability to engage in discussions and
exchange views with other future leaders should not be infringed
because of VMI's unwillingness to become coeducational.

195. 339 U.S. 637, 640-41 (1950); 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950); 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
196. Berman, supra note 15, at 214 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312-13 n.48 (1978)).
197. Jones exrel- Michele v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 632 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
"The attainment of a diverse student body... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for
an institution of higher education." Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 311-12 (1978)).
198. Jones, 632 F. Supp. at 1324. "[T]here is no constitutional right to the best education
possible." Although a single-sex school may enhance some individuals' academic experiences
(i.e., men), this consideration is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the right to education, with
all its intangible factors, has been infringed. Id.
199. Devan, supra note 46, at 530. But see id (stating also that the inclusion of both sexes
may result in a loss of quality).
200. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
201. Saferstein, supranote 15, at 663 (arguing for coeducation at VMI).
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3. Elimination and Prevention of the Perpetuationof Stereotypes
Socialization patterns have been regarded as intangible factors
related to education. A current socialization pattern is seen by the
way an individual develops based on preconceived ideas of who he or
she should be. Separating men and women tends to perpetuate
stereotypes about their proper roles in society. Individuals who are
stereotyped based on one characteristic, such as sex, are unable to
break traditional roles because of being separated. The legal theory
of equal rights, however,
[c]hallenges biological determinism by asserting that there is
substantial overlap between women and men as to most characteristics relevant to social roles and career options. Therefore,
...individuals should be free to choose among social roles and
careers on the basis of their individual inclinations and talents,
rather than be channeled into particular roles and careers on the
basis of rigid
and inaccurate notions about female and male
2°2
capacities.
Therefore, the elimination of stereotypes is one intangible benefit
that is closely related to another intangible benefit: making choices
20 3
free of preconceived ideas.
In Hogan, for example, the Court suggested that if the all-female
admissions' policy was upheld, men would be denied equal protection
because they would not receive the intangible benefit of pursuing
their own career choices and breaking the traditional roles of men
and women (i.e., women are better nurses) .204 The recent district
court decision in Garrettlends further support to the idea that equal
protection is necessary to ensure that no one, regardless of gender,
is denied the benefit of learning and developing free from preconceived notions of who he or she is. The court cautioned against
justifications for single-gender educational institutions predicated 20
on
"unsubstantiated notions" of the differences between gender groups. 5
Cases that advocate special programs designed to compensate for
as Mary Baldwin's Institute for
sex differences-such

202. Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equaliy, SexDifferences, and the Supreme Court,92 YALE L.J. 913, 916
(1983).
203. Some of the reasons historically used to limit women in their educational pursuits
consisted of such factors as their brains were too light and their ability to reason was not
adequate enough for rigorous academic programs. Rhode, supra note 174, at 290.
204. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
205. Inner-City Schools, supra note 15. at 1750. This conclusion is based on the precedent of
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which established that even though reasons may be
statistically measured, if they are loose-fitting generalities about gender, theywill not provide the
necessaryjustification. Id.
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Leadership---"have been more ideologically denigrating than
materially helpful. While some situations have been improved, the
conditions of inequality that made compensation seem necessary have
been altered virtually not at all."2" 6 In this particular situation,
VMI's plan simply emphasizes the stereotypes that women cannot
succeed in an adversative environment and that they require some
form of paternal nurturing.
Allowing VMI to legally implement its Plan and continue to exclude
women imposes generalized traits or characterizations, based on what
may be true for some individuals in a group, onto the entire group
(i.e., women cannot handle the adversative model, the lack of privacy,
or the physical rigor). Further, the atmosphere at many all-male
colleges encourages the admitted tendency to view women as sex
objects.0 7 As a result, misrepresentation occurs that not only can
be trivializing, but also perverse.0 8 The danger is "when sexist
stereotypes dictate associational policy they tend to become self-reinforcing."2 9 Hogan specifically stated that excluding males from
admission to Mississippi University for Women perpetuates stereotyped views of who should be a nurse, and, in enforcing that
presumption, makes it a self-fulfilling prophecy.2 10 The Hogan
decision presented examples of legislative attempts to keep women in
a subordinated position based on the generalized belief that women
could not perform a particular function as well as men.
The
Court specifically cautioned that objectives based on the presumed
innate inferiority of one gender are illegitimate. 2
The court of appeals' adoption of the argument that the introduction of women into VMI would change the VMI experience is based
on speculation of how VMI would offer an inferior experience if

206. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1292
(1991). In her article, which discusses primarily sexual assault and reproduction, she suggests
that the law of discrimination, focusing on accuracy of classification and categorization, "has
targeted inequality's failure of perception such that full human variety is not recognized ...
[and] is not permitted to exist." Id. at 1293.
207. Rhode, supra note 174, at 142. Coeducation may help eliminate these stereotypes and
may help promote a new view of women as potential equals in the post-graduation business and
professional world. Id.
208. MacKinnon, supra note 206, at 1293.
209. Rhode, supra note 174, at 123.
210. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982).
211. Id.at 725 n.10 (listing Myra Bradwell's attempt to challenge legislation that prohibited
women from practicing law because they were seen as unfit; the upholding by the Court of a
legislature's right to preclude women from bartending with the aim of preventing moral and
social problems; and the enactment of early labor laws designed to protect females, the weaker
sex).
212. Id. at 725.
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women were admitted."' The court did not rely on existing evidence that the integration of women into the United States military
academies such as West Point and the Naval Academy has been
positive."4 The speculative changes the court foresaw were based
on stereotypes of women: the adversative model would have to be
abandoned because women could not handle it; the nature of
dormitory life would have to change because women have a heightened need for personal privacy; and the physical education requirements would have to be altered because women would not be able to
pass. 1 5 Although some real differences admittedly exist, many of
the stereotypes that appear in the Plan are premised on the idea that
women require a nurturing and supportive environment. 16 As a
result, "VMI's all-male policy perpetuates outdated notions about men
and women's military capabilities by denying women consideration for
admission based on a strict gender classification."1 7
VMI's Plan allows stereotypes to dictate how the leadership program
is structured, as outlined in Section IV. Consequently, women will
develop in a way that reinforces preconceived ideas, such as their
need for a more nurturing environment, or their inability to survive
a high stress environment. Women will be steered in particular
directions and will not be free to choose their own paths.
Denying women the intangible factor of being free from stereotypes
in their educational environment has significant repercussions.
Legitimizing separatism in private institutions has the ramification of
entrenching it in public institutions."
Women's exclusion from
private spheres contributes to their exclusion from public spheres."' 9
"As long as women do not 'fit in' in the private worlds where

213. Berman, supra note 15, at 217. Women, historically, were kept out of institutions of
higher education because "[niot only were women thought generally incapable of intellectual
self-discipline and rigor, but the attempt to impose it on them was thought debilitating to both
mind and body." Jencks & Riesman, Feminism, Masculinism and Coeducation, in THE ACADEMIC
REVOLUTION 291-311 (1968), reprinted in SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND
REMEDIES, 1001.
214. Berman, supra note 15, at 217 & n. 27 (noting the argument of the proponents of the
bill directing the U.S. Service Academies to admit women in 1975; namely, that Service
Academies did not have as their sole purpose training leaders for combat and, therefore,
exclusion of women denied them equal opportunity for successful careers in comparison to male
officers).
215. Berman, supranote 15, at 218.
216. Berman, supra note 15, at 218 (noting one stereotype thatwomen would be "uncomfortable in VMI's stark and unattractive barracks").
217. Berman, supranote 15, at 214-15.
218. Rhode, supra note 174, at 109.
219. Rhode, supra note 174, at 120-21 (discussing how club membership has led to
enhanced individual status for men in their firms and/or their communities, while the exclusion
of women involves lost opportunities for informal exchanges, social status, and personal contacts
that generate career opportunities and lead to prestigious positions).
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friendships form and power congregates, they will never fully 'fit in'
in the public sectors with which the state is justifiably concerned."22 °
This broad statement has been narrowly applied in a military context.
If military training or education is constructed so that it is a
problem for women "to fit," then the answer is to reconstruct the
military and military service so that both men and women "fit."
Only women and men together, with whatever rearrangements that
fact requires, can define what military service is. Side-by-side
arrangements will only enshrine the male model ...and consign

the female experience to be judged as inferior. That inferiority will
then be attributed to... women's nature ....Differences can be
accounted for and privacy can be accounted for ... all in the

context of equal power and equal service.
The Plan, by infringing upon women's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, denies women (as well as men) the intangible
factor of developing free of the reigns of tradition in both education
and society. If the Plan is implemented in this private educational
sphere, women will be denied the intangible benefit of being free of
stereotypes in the private domain, and of "fitting in" in areas of the
public world.
Women who attend Mary Baldwin under the Plan are paying a high
price. 222 By attending a separate institution, women-as proposed
by the Plan-may have the equal opportunity to receive intangibles
such as support, solidarity, and self-esteem. At the same time, the
Plan encourages stereotypes of women and their inability to succeed
at VMI. Consequently, women are denied the intangible benefit of
deciding for themselves if they can succeed in the rigorous environment of VMI.
4. Empowerment and Leadership
Realizing one's full potential, strength, and power in the educational and societal spheres is still another intangible factor that should not
be denied to either gender. Education has the ability to empower an
individual; this opportunity of empowerment should be provided
equally to men and women. 223 As shown through research, women

220. Rhode, supra note 174, at 123-24.
221. Cheh, supra note 82, at 56.
222. "Separatist education, like other forms of separatist affiliation, offers the vices and
virtues of a ghetto: it provides support, solidarity, and self-esteem for subordinate groups, but
often at the price of perpetuating attitudes that perpetuate subordination." Rhode, supra note
174, at 143.
223. Many women students indicated that they were most empowered and developed
leadership skills through programs designed primarily for women. Mary Ann Danowitz Sagaria,
77TeCase for Empowering Women as Leaders in Higher Education, in EMPOWERING WOMEN:
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approach leadership development differently than men."' Studies
indicate women value commitment, affiliation, caringness, responsibility to others, and balancing work with relationships.2 25 Segregating
the sexes to develop leaders, however, may not be the solution to
accommodate the differences; expanding leadership models to
incorporate the values of women into models based on male values
may be better.22 6 To help women develop as leaders, institutions
of higher education must create experiences that are closely related
to the world women will experience.2 27 McLaurin confronted this
issue and required the removal of barriers so that individuals could
be judged based on their merits, and develop into leaders on the
same basis as any peer.228
Although the benefits of achieving individual autonomy and
fostering collective goals may be derived from sex-segregated
institutions, these educational establishments perpetuate collective
subordination. 229 Dominant groups often reinforce their privileged
positions in society and the corresponding stereotypes by choosing
specific forms of institutional separatism.230 Separatism imposed by
dominant groups differs significantly from separatism chosen by
21
subordinate groups.
Empowerment is closely related to other intangible factors. For
example, because men and women have the same responsibility to
empower women students as leaders,232 informal learning and the
elimination of stereotypes are equally necessary.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES ON CAMPUS 9 (Mary Ann Danowitz Sagaria ed., 1988).

However, the author advocates a view of leadership that is integrated into women's lives and
does not necessarily advocate women colleges. Id. at 10.
224. See Sagaria, supranote 223, at 6.
225. See Sagaria, supranote 223, at 6.
226. Sagaria, supra note 223, at 7.
227. Sagaria, supra note 223, at 7. One suggestion is to provide a setting that helps women
develop the ability to relate to many different people. Id.
228. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
229. Rhode, supra note 174, at 108-09.
230. Rhode, supra note 174, at 122 (relating the explanations given by private club members
for why they exclude women). One club manager explains, "If a man has a business deal to
discuss, he doesn't want to sit next to a woman fussing about how much mayonnaise is in her
chicken salad." Id. (citing Calvin Trillen, U.S. Journal: Tampa, Florida; FourPeople Who Do Not
Lunch at the University Club, NEW YORKER, Apr. 11, 1977, at 101).
231. Rhode, supra note 174, at 122.
232. Sagaria, supra note 223, at 7 (asserting the special importance of women as professionals
empowering women students as leaders, because of their influence by virtue of the fact that they
themselves are women).
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B. Intermediate Scrutiny
The courts have made progress in the area of racial equality by
preventing the establishment of separate institutions claiming to be
equal. The premise that these institutions are inherently unequal
because they infringe on an individual's opportunity to receive certain
intangible benefits is now part of race-based equal protection
jurisprudence. In racial cases, strict scrutiny ensures the courts'
maintenance of the doctrine.
In the area of gender, however, courts still vacillate, and
single-gender institutions continue to exist. As a result, the racial
"inherently unequal" doctrine has not been incorporated completely
into the analysis of gender-based classification. Instead, courts have
concentrated on how race-based and gender-based classifications
differ and thus warrant different protection. Regardless of their
differences, courts must not ignore that the consequences are
substantially the same for racial and sexual segregation: the denial of
intangible factors and the denial of equal protection.
The courts' use of intermediate scrutiny helps to eliminate some of
the gender-based separations. The exclusion of women from
admission to VMI must be examined under this level of scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the proposed plan submitted by VMI
violates equal protection.
The important government objective at issue is the development of
young adults into future leaders. For VMI, the objective is specifically
to develop citizen-soldiers who will have the ability to be leaders after
graduation-an important governmental goal. The substantially
related means to achieve that goal, however, cannot be segregation,
as the Plan suggests. The substantially related means, which would
allow VMI to meet both prongs of intermediate scrutiny, must be
coeducation.
The ultimate goal of equal protection is often forgotten as courts
become preoccupied with articulating important goals and substantial
The Hogan Court expressed concern for the
relationships.2 33
unique educational opportunity provided to one gender and the
institution's failure to show any substantial relationship between the
important goal (a unique educational experience) and the means
(not providing the other sex that same unique opportunity) .234
233. "When unique and valuable educational opportunities are made available to only one
sex, the nebulous intermediate scrutiny standard can be used to obscure this prima facie denial
of equal protection." Saferstein, supra note 15, at 640.
234. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722 (1982).
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VMI contends its Plan offers the same kind of education to women
that they would receive if admitted to VMI. The Institute also
contends that by its segregation of men and women, both sexes would
benefit. This rationale is precisely the mask, under intermediate
scrutiny, that contributes to a continued denial of equal protection.
VMI's Plan does not provide equal protection when the mask is
removed.
VMI also asserts that the Plan, with its continuous segregation of
the sexes, is a substantially related means to several components of its
important goal, developing leaders. First, it protects women from the
harsh nature of the VMI training (because they are not capable of
surviving a stressful, physically rigorous, non-private environment) and
allows them to develop in an atmosphere suited for women.
However, the Court stated in Hogan that this rationale would not
even pass the first prong of intermediate scrutiny because protecting
members of one gender based on the assumption that they are
inherently handicapped is not a valid objective." 5
Second, VMI contends its Plan is substantially related to the goal of
leadership development because, by employing the means of sex
segregation, men can concentrate on becoming leaders and not be
distracted, sexually, because women are present. Garrett v. Board of
Education of the School District of Detroit addressed the same argument
and held that the single-gender policy did not pass intermediate
scrutiny. The success or failure of the education system to meet its
goal has not been shown to be related to whether males and females
attend the same institution.3
Thus, creating separate institutions-one program at VMI and one at Mary Baldwin-is not a
substantially related means to reach the goal of successfully training
leaders.
VMI may attempt to rely on McNair and Vorchheimer, which used
Williams as controlling authority, because the courts held
single-gender institutions did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Williams specifically held that states can legitimately create schools
with different missions in order to achieve a goal of educational
diversity. This reliance does not apply to the present Plan because it
ignores the Williams court's restriction that segregation is allowed only
if no intangible factors are denied. As discussed previously, the Plan
denies women four intangible factors. Moreover, the court held in
Williams that no unique feature was being given to one gender and

235. Id. at 725.
236. Garrett v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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not to the other.3 7 Under the Plan, in contrast, women are still
being denied the unique combination of education, military training,
and leadership development that exists at VMI.
More importantly, it must be remembered that both Williams and
Vorchheimer were decided before the Court expressly adopted
intermediate scrutiny in educational cases in Hogan. Since that time,
the cases involving the issues VMI presents have found that
single-gender schools infringe on rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In addition, the opinion that "the nonexistence of a market for
such schools [like VMI] ought to tell us something about the
reasonableness of VMI's admissions policy ... ."23 suggests that the
courts should revert back to a time when scrutinization by the Court
did not exist in the realm of gender or race discrimination.2 39 Since
Plessy, and throughout the development of both strict and intermediate scrutiny in education, the Court has determined that the number
of people openly expressing a denial of rights is immaterial to the
issue of whether the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.
Equal rights are based the individual, not on how many people want
that right. Thus, the protection afforded by intermediate scrutiny of
gender-based classifications remains unaffected by the fact that VMI
can point to only one woman who has judicially contested its
admissions policy.
The parallels between the line of cases leading to Brown and the
development of precedent in gender-based classification decisions are
crucial. The Court, rejecting the separate but equal doctrine and
developing strict scrutiny as it was applied to race, did not create any
new right. Rather, the Court ensured that an already established
right would operate successfully in the context of the 1950s, a decade
in which education played a significant role, and in which racial
segregation greatly impeded citizens' full enjoyment of civil rights.2 4
Critics argued that the Court's decision in Brown was wrong because
it contradicted the current social practices of the 1950s; "but it was

237. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'dpercuriam,401 U.S. 951
(1971).
238. Ides, supra note 45, at 45-46.
239. Seesupranote 38 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's finding that the essence
of a constitutional right is personal, so that it does not matter how many people have been
discriminated against in order for the Court to find an Equal Protection violation).
240. Ides, supra note 45, at 43.

JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW

[Vol. 3:69

those practices and not the Court that were out-of-touch with
fundamental constitutional principles."24
In rejecting a separate institution and in applying intermediate
scrutiny for gender, no new right would be created. Although
admitting women to VMI might run contrary to the current social
practices within the boundaries of that campus, the courts should not
endorse these practices, which are clearly counter to equal protection.
"The pluralistic argument for preserving all-male colleges is uncomfortably similar to the pluralistic argument for preserving all-white
colleges ...."" It would be a more defendable argument if these
all-male colleges existed in a society where women were completely
equal to men; but they do not.243 Therefore, allowing them to
continue to exist would encourage unspoken assumptions about male
superiority and would require women to continue to be perceived as
inferior; this must not happen. 244 "Colleges and universities have
a moral responsibility to critique our social order and to provide
models to be emulated by other institutions, so that women can
245
participate more fully and equitably in society.
VI. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
AT VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE

Coeducation is a means that is substantially related to the important
governmental interest of shaping the leaders of tomorrow's society.
Leadership programs for women and men together approximate the
reality that women and men must work together.2 41 Coeducational
programs highlight characteristics that women and men must explore
in order to discover similarities and differences among themselves,
and in order to appreciate and respect both how they differ and what
they share.247 Men and women, in order to develop into leaders,
cannot be excluded from exposure to the unique perspectives the

241. Ides, supranote 45, at 43. Ides goes on to suggest, however, that gender discrimination
cannot be considered in the same manner because in this area the Court has been more
creative. I disagree; the social practices are still out-of-touch. Ides states that "but for the
creative, and somewhat nonjudicial impulses of the Supreme Court during the 1970's, VMI's
all-male admissions policy would be plainly constitutional. In this manner, the district court's
resolution of the controversy reflected the normal, acceptable, indeed, constitutionally required
conservatism of the judicial function." Id.at 44.
242. Jencks & Riesman, supranote 213, at 1003.
243. Jencks & Riesman, supranote 213, at 1003.
244. Jencks & Riesman, supranote 213, at 1003.
245. Sagaria, supra note 223, at 6.
246. Mary Ann Danowitz Sagaria & Lisa L. Koogle, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts: Strategy
andResources, in EMPOWERING WOMEN: LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES ON Campus, supra

note 223, at 89, 91.
247. Id.
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other sex brings to developing solutions for contemporary societal
problems.24 Coeducational institutions provide excellent opportunities to apply these new understandings to leadership roles.2 49 As
a result, coeducation makes it more likely that the government will
attain its goal of developing leaders who can function successfully in
a gender-integrated society.
If society permits institutions to establish separate programs for
women who achieve in nontraditional (i.e., nonfemale) ways,
individuals' efforts to meet their potential are seriously impeded, and
their ability to improve society is limited. Although men and women
often take different approaches to moral or political issues, men and
women who choose to join a particular group will not necessarily
Thus, organizations should not
differ in those approaches." 0
exclude a gender based on the mere attitudinal characteristics
attributed to that sex."~ "The court erred ... by failing to realize
that the women who apply to VMI will want the VMI experience, as
is. These will be women who seek the whole VMI challenge, not a
The choice offered to women of
relaxed, special program." 2
attending Mary Baldwin's Institute for Leadership is a mirror attempt
to deflect the underlying constitutional violation. "[T] he danger of
sustaining paternalistic classifications [is not] mitigated by the fact
that women can accept or reject, as a matter of personal choice, the
'benefits' offered by the state."253 Often the voluntary nature of a
program only masks an underlying sexual oppression and women's
passive acceptance of sexual stereotypes.25 4
The need for single-gender environments decreases greatly as the
level of education increases. 255 Although in the past an all-female
institute of post-secondary education may have been especially
supportive of women "by providing role models, leadership opportuni-

248. See generally id.; but see supranote 223 and accompanying text.
249. Sagaria & Koogle, supra note 246, at 91. The counterargument is that social norms and
expectations continue to influence the way women perceive themselves and their abilities, and
shape their aspirations; thus, to some extent, programs designed solely for women are still
essential. Id. Furthermore, opponents of coeducation still argue that "coeducation ignore[s]
'natural' differences in the sexes' mental capacities and social roles. Joint instruction would
compromise traditional academic standards and coarsen feminine sensibilities. Related concerns
involve [] the decline in athletic achievement, alumni contributions, and academic inquiry that
would reportedly follow from female intrusion; women could scarcely be expected to hold their
own on the football field or in rigorous analysis of 'delicate' subjects." Rhode, supra note 174,
at 292-93 (citations omitted).
250. Rhode, supra note 174, at 120.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Berman, supra note 15, at 218.
ConstitutionalLaw: The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV. 62, 119 (1982).
Id. at 120 (footnote omitted).
Saferstein, supranote 15, at 673 n.166.
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ties, and positive faculty/student interaction, such characteristics [of
an all-female setting] should become more dominant in coeducational
environments as well.", 6 Indeed, in contemporary society, as the
remedial role of all-female schools is decreases, one goal of today's
women's colleges should be to create an environment that no longer
necessitates their compensatory function. 257
Therefore, Mary
Baldwin College should not encourage the continuing separation of
the program, nor should VMI be allowed to continue to violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
EPILOGUE

On November 15, 1993, the United States Justice Department filed
its opposition to VMI's Proposed Remedial Plan. 258 The Justice
Department asserts that the only way VMI could meet its requirements
under the Fourteenth Amendment was to admit women.25 9 Two
days later, on November 17, 1993, the Fourth Circuit ordered the
Citadel to allow Shannon Faulkner to attend classes while her lawsuit
was pending.2 10 She, too, challenged an all-male
academy's admis261
sion policy on the basis of equal protection.
The most recent line of cases-from Hogan in 1982, Garrettin 1991,
VMI in 1992, to the Citadel case in 1993-indicates that single-gender
institutions are finding it increasingly difficult to pass intermediate
scrutiny and are finding it harder to provide alternatives that do not
infringe on one gender's access to intangible factors. Following this
trend, VMI's Plan should be rejected, and integration, as the Justice
Department has urged, should be implemented.

256. Rhode, supra note 174, at 144.
257. Rhode, supra note 174 at 144. CompareJencks & Riesman, supra note 213, at 1005.09
(presenting the benefits of all-women colleges and tracing their development through the
schools' strengths and successes, but, at the same time, surmising the decline of women
attending these colleges).
258. Opposition, supranote 170.
259. Opposition, supranote 170, at 2-3.
260. Woman to Attend CitadelClasses,WASH. Posr, Nov. 18, 1993, atA17. While Faulkner has

been allowed to attend day classes at the Citadel sinceJanuary 1994, she is not allowed to wear
the military uniform, cannot march as a cadet, and must live off campus. Id. Such full
integration at the Citadel is the focus of her current law suit.
261. Id.Shannon Faulkner was accepted into the all-male core at the Citadel in 1993 after
asking that reference to her gender be deleted from her high school transcripts, After the
Citadel learned that Shannon was a female, they revoked her acceptance. Citadel Told to Devise
Planfor Woman Student, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 29, 1994, at A18. However, one writer noted

that although Faulkner has indicated she is interested in attending the Citadel in part because
of its discipline, she has "already violated the school's most sacred tenet, the honor code, by
misleading admissions officers about her sex when she applied." Linda Chavez, Single-Sex Schools:
Why We Need Them, USA TODAY, June 1, 1994, at News Section.
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On April 29, 1994, the United States District Court ruled to endorse
VMI's and Virginia's efforts to create a similar program for women at
Mary Baldwin College.26 2 The district court judge agreed with
Virginia's position that an all-female program furnishing women "an
outcome ...

comparable" to what VMI gives men would satisfy the

demands of the appeals court and the Constitution, without adopting
methods the same as or similar to those used at VMI.2

3

The Justice

4

Department has appealed this decision.
In the parallel case involving the Citadel, also in the Fourth
Circuit, 265 the federal district court judge in Charleston, South

Carolina, requested both parties to restrict their arguments to the
issue of why South Carolina's education policy is inherently different
from that of Virginia's. Otherwise, the Citadel should be bound by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's recent decision that
VMI's policy of excluding women is discriminatory.2 6
The Citadel trial continued through May, 1994. Faulkner, as well
as two other women who seek admission to the Citadel, have
renounced the option of attending a similar all-women's program,
reflective of VMI's attempt to establish such a program at Mary
Baldwin.26 7 On July 22, 1994, the Citadel was ordered to admit
Faulkner; however, the court did not decide if the Citadel would be
required to admit women in the future. 2" Faulkner's triumph,
however, was short-lived. The Friday before she was scheduled to
become the first female cadet, the United States Forth Circuit Court
of Appeals granted the Citadel's motion to prevent her from
matriculating as a full cadet until December, 1994, when the court
will hear a formal appeal. 269 Thus, women's fights for equal protection at both VMI and the Citadel have not ended.

262. SeeUnited States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994). The court ordered VMI
to have the plan operational by Fall, 1995. Id.
263. Martin Well, Judge Backs Males-Only VMT Policy: Alternative Program is Ruled Acceptable,
WASH. PosT, May 1, 1994, at B3.
264. MaryJordan, Appeals Court Keeps FaulknerOut of Citadel, WASH. PosT, Aug. 13, 1994 at
A3 (outlining briefly the history of the parallel VMI case).
265. Faulkner v.Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993).
266. Catherine S. Manegold, Arguments Begin at Trialon Citadel'sMalePolicy, N.Y. TImES, May
17, 1994, at A16.
267. Henry Eichel, supra note 41, at Al.
268. Mary Jordan, Citadel Ordered to Admit Women; Shannon Faulknerto Be First Female Cadet
at the MilitarySchool, WASH. POsT,July 23, 1994 at Al. "U.S. DistrictJudge C. Weston Houck...
has left open the possibility that the school could establish a parallel program for women in
1995 at another college." Id. (indicating that this solution would protect Faulkner's Equal
Protection rights and reserving his opinion on whether a parallel program would offer the same
protection).
269. MaryJordan, supra note 264, at A3.

